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ARTICLES
MISERY AND MYOPIA: UNDERSTANDING THE




In an increasingly interdependent world, human migration is just another
element of the global marketplace. While much migration occurs through
legal channels and as an exercise of free will on the part of the migrant, not
all migration is undertaken by choice. Various forms of irregular migration
have been spurred by social conflict, civil war, and the global consolidation
of economic power centers.'
The United States has never developed an immigration strategy that
effectively grapples with the global forces that drive migration. Ad hoc
efforts to respond to certain effects of global migration have consistently
failed to deal realistically with the problems and blessings of migration. In
this regard, the passage and enforcement of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 ("Trafficking Act," "TVPA," or "Act") 2 is
* Assistant Professor, University of California, Davis, School of Law;
jmchacon@ucdavis.edu. J.D., Yale Law School, 1998; A.B., Stanford University, 1994. 1
am grateful to Diane Marie Amann, Bill Ong Hing, Kevin R. Johnson and Angela
Onwuachi-Willig for their thoughtful comments on various drafts of this paper and to
Fabiola Murrillo for her dedicated research assistance. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the
many people who provided helpful comments on this project in late 2004 and early 2005.
All errors are mine alone.
1. Maggy Lee, Human Trade and the Criminalization of Irregular Migration, 33 Int'l
J. Soc. Law 1, 1 (2005).
2. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C
(2000)). The Act was amended and reauthorized by the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2003 ("TVPAII"), Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (to be
codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.). It was amended and reauthorized
again by the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 ("TVPAIII"), Pub.
L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 and 22 U.S.C.),
which was signed into law on January 10, 2006. Because the 2005 reauthorization occurred
shortly before this Article was to go to press, this Article does not attempt to assess the
efficacy of the programs piloted in the most recent reauthorization. On the international
level, the new law authorizes a joint State Department/United States Agency for
International Development study of trafficking problems in situations of post-conflict and
humanitarian emergency assistance, and requires increased monitoring of forced labor in
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paradigmatic. The Trafficking Act is intended to offer statutory protection
to the victims of severe forms of human trafficking, to increase criminal
penalties for persons who commit such acts of trafficking, and to foster
international cooperation in efforts to combat human trafficking. 3
The Trafficking Act has inspired a great deal of scholarly comment and
criticism. 4 Unfortunately, there is almost universal consensus that the
Trafficking Act, while well-intentioned, has thus far failed to make
sufficient strides in addressing the problem of human trafficking, either
internationally or domestically. The most recent diagnoses of the domestic
failure are tending to converge: Commentators note that the Act-
particularly as it has been implemented-emphasizes the law enforcement
countries that do not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. Id.
§§ 101, 105. Domestically, the law establishes a pilot program for residential rehabilitative
facilities for trafficking victims in the United States, as well as expanded funding for other
programs to protect victims; authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction over trafficking offenses
committed by U.S. government employees; requires research and statistical review of
domestic trafficking and a biennial conference on "trafficking and commercial sex acts" that
occur in the U.S.; and establishes a grant program to enhance state and local anti-trafficking
initiatives. Id. §§ 201-04. Among its proposed aims is an increased focus on labor
trafficking. Id § 2.
3. TVPA § 102(a) ("The purposes of this division are to combat trafficking in persons,
a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and
children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their
victims."); see also U.S. Dep't of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report 5-6 (2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf [hereinafter 2005 State Department
Report].
4. See Michelle R. Adelman, International Sex Trafficking: Dismantling the Demand,
13 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 387 (2004); Theresa Barone, The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act of 2000: Defining the Problem and Creating a Solution, 17 Temp. Int'l &
Comp. L.J. 579 (2003); Claire Bishop, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000:
Three Years Later, Int'l Migration, Dec. 2003, at 219; Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Human
Trafficking: Protecting Human Rights in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 25 B.C.
Third World L.J. 451 (2005); Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Violation:
The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating
Trafficking, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1143 (2003); Tala Hartsough, Asylum for Trafficked Women:
Escape Strategies Beyond the T Visa, 13 Hastings Women's L.J. 77 (2002); Kelly E. Hyland,
Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American Framework, 16 Berkeley Women's
L.J. 29 (2001); Suzanne H. Jackson, To Honor and Obey: Trafficking in "Mail-Order
Brides," 70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 475 (2002); Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreshchyshyn, Human
Trafficking Private Right of Action: Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States,
16 Hastings Women's L.J. 1 (2004); Ivy C. Lee & Mie Lewis, Human Trafficking from a
Legal Advocate's Perspective: History, Legal Framework and Current Anti-Trafficking
Efforts, 10 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 169 (2003); Juliet Stumpf & Bruce Friedman,
Advancing Civil Rights Through Immigration Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 6
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 131 (2002); Susan Tiefenbrun, The Saga of Susannah, A U.S.
Remedy for Sex Trafficking in Women: The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000, 2002 Utah L. Rev. 107; Michael R. Candes, Comment, The Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Will It Become the Thirteenth Amendment
of the Twenty-First Century?, 32 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 571 (2001); Note,
Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2171, 2180-2280 (2005)
[hereinafter Note, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act].
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components of anti-trafficking initiatives in a way that undercuts the Act's
humanitarian goals of assisting trafficking victims.5
Much of the literature diagnosing the domestic shortcomings of the
TVPA focuses upon the legal barriers to relief that are encountered by
trafficking victims in the United States. The proposed solutions focus on
improving the identification and assistance of trafficking victims in the
United States. But the United States is not a passive recipient of trafficked
human beings. Efforts to deal more effectively and humanely with the
domestic manifestations of global human trafficking must take account of
the role that the United States plays in generating a viable market for
trafficking. This requires express recognition that specific elements of U.S.
law and policy actually facilitate the trafficking of human beings into and
within the United States. When the issue is framed in this way, it quickly
becomes evident that the shortcomings of the Trafficking Act are neither
new nor unique failures;6 they are simply the most recent examples of the
wider failure of U.S. law to successfully assess and grapple with the global
and domestic forces that drive migration.
This Article argues that current labor and immigration law enforcement
actually creates incentives for trafficking and other forms of migrant
exploitation in the United States. This Article situates the Trafficking Act
within the framework of its legal antecedents in an effort to illustrate the
ways in which the inability of the TVPA to substantially meet its goals of
preventing trafficking and protecting trafficking victims stems from more
general failures of domestic immigration policy. By broadening the scope
of the inquiry concerning the shortcomings of the TVPA, this Article seeks
to clarify the ways in which the TVPA actually may be interacting in a
detrimental way with other immigration and labor policy choices.
Border interdiction strategies, harsh penalties for undocumented migrant
workers, and insufficient labor protections for all workers, but particularly
undocumented migrants, all interact to facilitate trafficking,
notwithstanding the TVPA. Furthermore, because Congress was anxious to
5. See, e.g., Dalrymple, supra note 4, at 472-73 (concluding that the humanitarian aims
of the Act have been underemphasized in favor of prosecution); Hussein Sadruddin, Natalia
Walter & Jose Hidalgo, Human Trafficking in the United States: Expanding Victim
Protection Beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 379 (2005) (finding that
the Act is more concerned with prosecution than victim protection); Note, The Trafficking
Victims Protection Act, supra note 4, at 2194 (positing that overemphasis of prosecution-
oriented components of the TVPA, relative to components of the Act dedicated to victim
protection and global prevention, account for the Act's shortcomings).
6. Nor are the failures unique to U.S. anti-trafficking efforts. For a thoughtful analysis
of the ways in which international anti-trafficking initiatives have similarly failed to deal
with the multifaceted nature of the trafficking problem, see Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models
Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to Human Trafficking, 40 Stan. J. Int'l L. 1
(2004); cf LeRoy G. Potts, Jr., Note, Global Trafficking in Human Beings: Assessing the
Success of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent Trafficking in Persons, 35 Geo. Wash.
Int'l L. Rev. 227 (2003) (suggesting ways in which the United Nations and member states
can more effectively combat trafficking in the wake of the United Nations Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children).
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limit assistance under the TVPA to a narrowly defined subset of trafficking
victims, 7 it deliberately chose to exclude a broad range of labor exploitation
from the reach of the TVPA. This policy choice likely exacerbates
workplace exploitation by constructively laying blame upon many
noncitizen workers for their exploitation.
This Article is divided into three parts. The first part defines the scope of
the trafficking problem. Although it seems a simple matter, the exercise of
defining trafficking and distinguishing trafficking from human smuggling
actually sets the parameters of the problem to be addressed. Indeed, the
inability of the U.S. legal regime to effectively grapple with domestic
manifestations of the international human trafficking crisis stems in part
from the fact that U.S. lawmakers have relied upon unrealistic
understandings of trafficking and its victims.8 Thus, this Article begins by
examining an internationally accepted definition of trafficking, and
contrasting it to the more narrow definition adopted in the TVPA.
Congress's efforts to limit the assistance available under the Act to purely
"innocent victims" explains the substantial differences between these
definitions.
The second part of the Article analyzes the TVPA. It begins with a brief
overview of the history of the Act, and then looks in detail at the Act's
provisions. The bulk of the TVPA actually consists of older laws.
Therefore, this part surveys constitutional and legislative provisions barring
involuntary servitude and protecting workers; legislation criminalizing
"alien smuggling;" and legislation criminalizing interstate and international
sex trafficking. In passing the TVPA, members of Congress recognized
that existing laws were ineffective in preventing trafficking. Unfortunately,
they largely refused to recognize and address the ways in which these laws
actually contribute to the trafficking and more general exploitation of
workers. Consequently, legislative revisions brought the crime of
"trafficking" into the prosecutorial mainstream, but did nothing to address
the ways in which the preexisting legal regime upon which the TVPA is
built actually facilitates trafficking.
The third part of the Article explores the reasons for the limited nature of
the Act's successes. The Act to date has been somewhat ineffectual. On
the domestic level, few victims of trafficking have actually been identified
and assisted. Similarly, the government has prosecuted only a small
number of trafficking cases over the last five years. Moreover, there is no
clear evidence that the Act is effectively preventing trafficking. This part
illustrates the ways in which the shortcomings of the TVPA echo the
failures of the anti-trafficking endeavors that existed prior to the passage of
the TVPA. As before, current anti-trafficking efforts are characterized by:
the presumptive criminality of migrants; a willingness to sacrifice the
protection of migrants in the furtherance of criminal prosecutions; a
7. See infra Part III.B. 1.
8. See infra Part II.B. 1.
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conflation of trafficking and prostitution; a racially biased conception of
trafficking; and a dogged focus on interdiction efforts over internal
enforcement and outreach. This part suggests that the Act has had a limited
impact upon domestic trafficking because it did almost nothing to address
the ways in which U.S. law and policy render migrants vulnerable to
exploitation.
The Trafficking Act has undoubtedly made important strides toward
assisting some of the most exploited victims of trafficking. The Act has
also charted innovative waters in international policy by taking steps to
combat social and market factors that promote or "push" international
trafficking. At a minimum, the TVPA has played an important role in
bringing attention to the trafficking issue at the domestic level for the first
time in decades. Yet the reach of the TVPA has been limited. This Article
underscores the importance of viewing the TVPA within the larger legal
landscape, because its shortcomings are emblematic of, and cannot be
solved without first addressing, much deeper and broader systemic flaws in
our legislative approaches to immigration issues. The continued failure to
address these issues may ensure that the Act does more to perpetuate
systemic incentives for migrant exploitation than to remedy the domestic
manifestations of trafficking.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
The label "human trafficking" has been applied to the migration of
certain individuals across and within national boundaries for purposes of
performing labor 9-including sex work-under "coercive conditions." 10 It
may involve deception, abduction, or debt bondage. I"
Estimates on the number of individuals trafficked each year vary, and
because they involve undocumented migration, are necessarily imprecise.
12
9. As used here, labor includes sex work. Some scholars and activists take the position
that prostitution or sex work is inherently coercive, while others posit that sex work is no
more inherently coercive than any other form of labor. See Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Sex Sells
but Drugs Don't Talk: Trafficking of Women Sex Workers, 23 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 199, 205-
06 (2001) (explaining the difference between the two schools of thought). Current
discussions about human trafficking are distorted by the focus on prostitution to the
exclusion of other trafficking issues, see infra Part III.B.3, and the conflation of anti-
trafficking efforts with efforts to criminalize prostitution have hampered rather than helped
current anti-trafficking efforts. In treating sex work as a subset of labor, this Article seeks to
avoid such distortions.
10. Answering the question of what constitutes coercion is also an important predicate to
defining trafficking. The issue is complex, and has been one of the flash points surrounding
both international and domestic debates on trafficking. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha,
Trafficking, Smuggling, and Human Rights, Migration Info. Source, Mar. 1, 2005, available
at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/print.cfm?ID=294 (discussing the
"consent/coercion seesaw").
11. Lee, supra note 1, at 6.
12. See Frank Laczko & Marco A. Gramegna, Developing Better Indicators of Human
Trafficking, 10 Brown J. World Aff. 179 (2003) (discussing limits on the availability of
reliable trafficking data due in part to reluctance of governmental organizations to share
2006] 2981
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Statistics compiled by the U.S. government estimate that between 600,000
and 800,000 men, women, and children are trafficked across international
borders each year, that eighty percent of these people are women and girls,
and that fifty percent of them are minors. 13 The International Labor
Organization ("ILO") of the United Nations 14 estimates that at any given
time, about 12.3 million people are trapped in situations of bonded labor,
forced child labor, sexual servitude, and involuntary servitude. 15  A
significant number of trafficking victims enter the United States each year.
In 1999, the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") estimated that 50,000
women and children were trafficked into the United States each year.' 6
This figure was subsequently revised downward, and the current estimate is
that 14,500 to 17,500 people are trafficked into the United States each
year, ' 7 but other estimates place the number closer to 100,000. 18
A. Defining the Problem
The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children 19 ("U.N. Protocol") offers an
information and proposing greater reliance on information gathered by the International
Organization of Migration and victim-assistance nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs")).
13. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 6. Similarly, the United Nations
Population Fund estimates that between 700,000 and 2 million women are trafficked across
international borders annually. United Nations Population Fund, Trafficking in Human
Misery, http://www.unfpa.org/gender/trafficking.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). Adding
internal domestic trafficking to this figure brings the number as high as four million. 2005
State Department Report, supra note 3, at 6.
14. The International Labor Organization ("ILO") is the United Nations ("U.N.") agency
responsible for labor standards, employment, and social protection issues. 2005 State
Department Report, supra note 3, at 7.
15. Id.
16. Francis T. Miko, Cong. Research Serv., Trafficking in Women and Children: The
U.S. and International Response (2002), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9107.pdf.
17. U.S. Dep't of State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000:
Trafficking in Persons Report 23 (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/34158.pdf [hereinafter 2004 State Department
Report]. This estimate only counts those individuals who are presumed to meet the
definition of "severe forms of trafficking in persons," set forth in the TVPA, 22 U.S.C. §
7102(8) (2000). The State Department explains that the reasons for the smaller number
include "improvements in data collection and methodology rather than trends in trafficking."
U.S. Dep't of State, Assessment of U.S. Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons § III.A
(2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/23598.pdf [hereinafter
2003 State Department Report]. It is this change in data collection-keyed to a narrower
definition of trafficking-that accounts for the rapid reduction in the overall number of
estimated trafficking victims that enter the U.S. each year. It does not reflect any actual
decline in the number of trafficking victims.
18. Shelley Case Inglis, Expanding International and National Protections Against
Trafficking for Forced Labor Using a Human Rights Framework, 7 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
55, 71 (2001).
19. U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, at 31, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc.
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internationally agreed-upon definition of trafficking. The U.N. Protocol
defines trafficking as
(a)... the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion,
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position
of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs ....
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended
exploitation.., shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth
[above] have been used.
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer.., of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall be considered "trafficking in persons" even
if this does not involve any of the means set forth [above]. 20
Because of its detailed and illustrative nature, the definition of trafficking
in the U.N. Protocol is a useful place to start any discussion of trafficking.
This definition contains an extensive list of the sorts of conduct that might
constitute trafficking: threat or use of force or coercion; kidnapping, fraud,
and deception; and even the "abuse of power" or an abuse of the
"vulnerability" of the victim, whenever such conduct results in the
exploitation of the victim. Exploitation may occur in the person's transport,
but it may also occur in the person's recruitment, harboring, or receipt.
This means that the movement of the individual, either within or across
borders, is not a necessary component of trafficking. The definition also
gives examples of the sorts of conduct that constitute exploitation, and such
conduct includes sexual exploitation and other forms of involuntary
servitude or forced labor, such as organ removal.
The U.N. Protocol drafters made two important definitional choices.
First, they incorporated an expansive definition of coercion. Coercion does
not require the use of physical force or threats; it can encompass many acts
including abuse of a "position of vulnerability."'2 1 They took no position on
whether prostitution inherently contains an element of coercion, as this
topic was the subject of sharp disagreement among member states.22
Second, they defined trafficking to require "exploitation," but leave that
term undefined, instead providing examples of the many kinds of conduct
that might be deemed exploitative. 23
A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 335, 384-85 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol].
The United States Senate ratified the U.N. Protocol on October 7, 2005.
20. Id. art. 3, paras. (a)-(c).
21. Id. art. 3, para. (a); Bhabha, supra note 10.
22. Bhabha, supra note 10.
23. U.N. Protocol, supra note 19, art. 3, para (a); Bhabha, supra note 10.
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The definition of trafficking that was developing at the time for use in the
U.N. Protocol provided an important template for the TVPA passed by the
United States Congress in 2000. However, the TVPA does not contain a
definition of trafficking that tracks the U.N. Protocol definition. The
distinctions are important evidence of the policy considerations that shaped
the TVPA.
The TVPA actually contains two tiers of trafficking. First, there is the
act of "trafficking," which qualifies as trafficking for purposes of criminal
liability, for international prevention measures, and for certain discretionary
protective services for victims. However, a distinct definition is used to
determine who is actually eligible for full relief under the Act's protective
provisions-namely, victims of "severe forms of trafficking in persons. '24
Thus, one might be a trafficking victim, but still ineligible for certain relief
under the Act. The TVPA does not provide its own definition of
"trafficking." 25  The Act does include a definition of "severe forms of
trafficking in persons." This is defined as
sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force,
fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has
not attained 18 years of age; or
the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion
for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt
bondage, or slavery. 26
Because the U.N. Protocol envisions protection for all victims of
trafficking (as that term is defined in the Protocol), but the U.S. law only
guarantees such protections for victims of "severe forms of trafficking in
persons," it is worth noting that there are important distinctions between the
TVPA definition of "severe forms of trafficking in persons" and the
definition of human trafficking provided by the U.N. Protocol.
First, the TVPA makes no specific provisions concerning the role of
victim consent. It is an open question under the TVPA whether the consent
24. The Conference report states,
In various sections, the conference agreement uses more general terms such as
"trafficking" or "trafficking in persons" rather than the more limited term "severe
forms of trafficking in persons." In such contexts, these terms are intended to be
used in a more general sense, giving the President and other officials some degree
of discretion to apply the relevant provisions to a broader range of actions or
victims beyond those associated with severe forms of trafficking in persons. ...
Where, however, this Act uses the term "victims of severe forms of trafficking,"
even in provisions related to protection and assistance, the application of such
provisions is limited to such victims.
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, H.R. Rep. No. 106-939 (2000)
(Conf. Rep.).
25. It does include a definition of "sex trafficking," which is defined as "the recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial




of the individual to some element of the act of trafficking obviates the
conclusion that the individual is a victim of a "severe form of trafficking."
In contrast, the definition of trafficking set forth in the U.N. Protocol
expressly excludes the victim's consent as a relevant factor.27  The
distinction between trafficking and smuggling under the U.N. Protocol rests
solely on the presence of deception, coercion, or abuse of power. Where
these elements are present, "the consent of the victim ... to the intended
exploitation ... shall be irrelevant." 28 In other words, one cannot be seen
to consent to slave-like conditions that are imposed through deception,
coercion, or abuse of power under the U.N. Protocol.
Second, the TVPA definition of "severe forms of trafficking in persons"
automatically includes all persons under eighteen who are forced into sex
acts, but the blanket protection of children extends no further. Children
pose particularly difficult cases, because it is not clear when, if ever, they
can be treated as having "consented" to their trafficking. Because the
Trafficking Act purportedly aims to protect all non-consenting victims, one
might expect that all children in coercive labor arrangements would be
treated as victims of "severe forms of trafficking in persons." But this is
not the case. 29 In contrast to the U.S. approach, the U.N. Protocol includes
all children who were "recruit[ed], transport[ed], transfer[red], harbour[ed],
or receive[d]" by any means. 30 These differences have the overall effect of
establishing a more restrictive definition of trafficking on the domestic level
than that which is operative in the U.N. Protocol.
B. Distinguishing Trafficking from Smuggling and Other Forms of
Irregular Migration
Over six years after the completion of the drafting of the U.N. Protocol
and over five years after the passage of the Trafficking Act in the United
States, the distinction between trafficking and smuggling is still frequently
27. U.N. Protocol, supra note 19, art. 3, para. (b).
28. Id.
29. Children who are smuggled across the borders into the United States can be deported
rather than provided with assistance as trafficking victims. See Nina Bernstein, Children
Alone and Scared, Fighting Deportation, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2004, at AI ("Immigration
authorities have sought to deport many of the 5000 unaccompanied minors apprehended
each year, and others separated from their families, arguing for strict enforcement of the
rules to secure the nation's borders from illegal entrants."). Unaccompanied minors have
been granted greater protection and access to counsel in recent years, as their care has been
moved from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to the Office of
Refugee Resettlement ("ORR"), but they are still frequently detained, unable to obtain
counsel, and deported. See Christopher Nugent, Protecting Unaccompanied Immigrant and
Refugee Children in the United States, 32 Human Rts. 9, 9-10 (2005). The Unaccompanied
Alien Child Protection Act of 2005, S. 119, 109th Cong. (2005), which is currently pending
before Congress, seeks to address some of these issues. But passage of the legislation would
not ensure trafficking victim protections to all such children.
30. U.N. Protocol, supra note 19, art. 3, para. (c).
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misunderstood or ignored. 31 Even those who know that there is a legal
distinction between the terms disagree about how to define the differences.
Furthermore, because of the changing nature of international migration, the
line between smuggling and trafficking is becoming increasingly blurry.
As an initial matter, it is important to note that neither the U.N. Protocol
definition nor the U.S. Trafficking Act's definition of human "trafficking"
is synonymous with human "smuggling." 32 The journey may begin in the
same way. Some trafficking victims begin their journey in an act of
smuggling, as they freely undertake a decision to pay someone to assist
them in crossing the border into the United States and possibly even to find
a job within the United States. Others come into the United States through
legal channels, often on temporary, nonimmigrant visas, which they
overstay. Because each of these groups is legally understood to have
crossed the border of their own volition, I shall refer to them as "voluntary
migrants."33  Trafficking victims include a subset of voluntary migrants
who, once in this country, find themselves coerced into working under
conditions to which they never would have consented.34
Trafficking victims also include individuals who are not a subset of the
group of "voluntary migrants" previously identified, for it also encompasses
those who are forcibly taken from their homes or sold by their own families
31. See, e.g., Solomon Moore, LAPD Enlisted in Fight on Human Smuggling, L.A.
Times, Jan. 25, 2005, at B I (discussing an anti-trafficking initiative, but referring to "human
smuggling").
32. The U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, defines smuggling as "the procurement, in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a
State Party of which the person is not a national or permanent resident." U.N. Protocol,
supra note 19, Annex III, art. 3(a). Under U.S. law "alien smuggling" is prohibited by 8
U.S.C. § 1324a(l)(A)(i) (2000), which prohibits the conduct of
any person who-knowing that a person is an alien, bring[s] to or attempts to bring
to the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than a
designated port of entry or place other than as designated by the Commissioner,
regardless of whether such alien has received prior official authorization to come
to, enter, or reside in the United States and regardless of any future official action
which may be taken with respect to such alien.
Id. As with the international protocol, there is no requirement that the smuggler be
remunerated. Internal transportation and harboring are also prohibited. Id. § 1324a(l)(A)(ii),
(iii).
33. Of course, the issue of "voluntariness" is not an easy one. Much "voluntary
migration" occurs because economic or social conditions render migration the most viable
alternative. See Mirium Jordan, New Rules at the Border, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 2006, at BI.
This can be particularly true for women. See, e.g., Rhacel Salazar Parrefias, Servants of
Globalization: Women, Migration and Domestic Work (2001) (discussing the factors that
prompt women to leave the Philippines in search of work).
34. Implementing regulations for the TVPA provide that victims of "severe forms of
trafficking in persons" exclude individuals who choose to enter the country in violation of
immigration laws, even if those individuals are later subject to actions that constitute
"trafficking" for purposes of the prosecution of their traffickers. See Protection and
Assistance for Victims of Trafficking, 28 C.F.R. 1100 (2005); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(13)(T)(ii) (2000) (limiting T-visa relief to those who are physically present in the
U.S. "on account of such trafficking").
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and placed in positions of forced labor. The latter group is typically evoked
in discussions of human trafficking, 35 but the former-voluntary migrants
who later become subject to coerced labor, including sex work-is actually
the larger category. 36 This disconnect between perception and reality has
resulted in a law that is too narrow to reach a significant portion of the
domestic trafficking problem. 37
C. Dealing with Trafficking
In the late 1990s, two high-profile stories of forced immigrant labor
highlighted the existence of the trafficking problem in the United States.
First, in September of 1995, the police department in El Monte, California,
conducted a raid of a garment factory, discovering seventy-two Thai
nationals working in slave-like conditions. 38 They had been lured to the
country with promises of employment. 39 Upon arrival in the United States,
they were forced to work in a garment shop up to eighteen hours a day,
seven days a week, and were paid less than sixty cents an hour.40 The
owners restrained them by threats and physical violence. 41
Two years later, the New York City Police Department unearthed an
immigrant smuggling scheme involving as many as sixty-two deaf-mute
Mexicans who had been persuaded to come to the United States with
promises of jobs.42 Upon arriving in the United States, these migrants were
forced into a life of peddling and begging on the streets of New York City
35. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX), for example, has expressed the view that unless people
were "duped" into entering the country, they cannot qualify as victims of trafficking at all.
See Michael Hedges, Texans Tell of Trafficking Horror, Hous. Chron., July 8, 2004, at 5A.
36. See Francis T. Miko, Cong. Research Serv., Trafficking in Women and Children:
The U.S. and International Response 2-3 (2004), available at
http://fcp.state.gov/documents/organization/31990.pdf; Daniel Kyle & John Dale, Smuggling
the State Back In: Agents of Smuggling Reconsidered, in Global Human Smuggling:
Comparative Perspectives 29, 34 (David Kyle & Rey Koslowski eds., 2001) [hereinafter
Global Human Smuggling]; cf Debbie Nathan, Oversexed, Nation, Aug. 29, 2005, at 27
(asserting that the little evidence that exists suggests that "most immigrants who work as
prostitutes do so voluntarily"). Nora Demleitner has observed a parallel phenomenon in
Western European trafficking: "Many media reports focus on the very small number of
women who were forcibly abducted from their home country, transported to Western
Europe, and there forced into prostitution. Although these cases do occur, they constitute the
least likely scenario of sexual slavery. Nevertheless, they are frequently used as
paradigmatic cases." Nora V. Demleitner, The Law at a Crossroads: The Construction of
Migrant Women Trafficked into Prostitution, in Global Human Smuggling, supra, at 257,
264.
37. See infra Part 1II.A.
38. William Branigin, Sweatshop Instead of Paradise: Thais Lived in Fear as Slaves at
L.A. Garment Factories, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1995, at Al.
39. Id.
40. Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment Litigation
Strategy to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 San Diego L. Rev. 397, 401
(1999).
41. Julie A. Su, Making the Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, I
J. Gender Race & Just. 405, 406 (1998).
42. Incidents: Mexico-USA, 16 Trafficking in Migrants 3 (1997), available at
http://www.iom.int/documents/publication/en/tm16.pdf.
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for eighteen hours a day, seven days a week. 43 When they failed to meet
their $600 per week quotas, they were subject to physical abuses such as
beatings and electrocution, as well as mental abuse and sexual
molestation. 44 While they saw very little of the benefit, their work was part
of a much larger scheme that yielded over a million dollars a year in profits
for the ringleaders. 45
At the time the two events unfolded, the law had no coherent way of
dealing with the many victims of the trafficking scheme. Under existing
law, they were not legally authorized to work in the United States or to
remain in the country. 46  Furthermore, in order to ensure that the
perpetrators of these schemes were punished, prosecutors had to resort to a
broad array of criminal provisions, and there were few provisions designed
to assist the noncitizen workers who were the victims of these schemes.
In the El Monte case, the Department of Justice, through the U.S.
Attorney's office in Los Angeles, charged the operators of the garment
factory with involuntary servitude, criminal conspiracy, kidnapping by
trick, and smuggling and harboring individuals in violation of U.S.
immigration law.47 Meanwhile, the workers filed a civil lawsuit in federal
district court in Los Angeles, alleging false imprisonment, labor law and
civil rights violations, and claims under the civil provisions of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") against the
immediate operators of the El Monte compound. 48 Similar allegations were
brought against the manufacturers and retailers. 49 This legal battle could
not even begin until the workers won a legal battle with the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS") that freed them from imprisonment. 50
Only after that legal struggle were the workers issued S-visas, which
allowed them to remain in the country lawfully to pursue their claims
because the Attorney General had certified that they were capable of
providing "critical, reliable information concerning a criminal organization
or enterprise." 51
43. Mark Fineman, Deaf Migrants' Families Had Feared Abuse, L.A. Times, July 22,
1997, at A1; Deborah Sontag, Poor and Deaffrom Mexico Betrayed in their Dreams, N.Y.
Times, July 25, 1997, at Al.
44. Ian Fisher, US. Indictment Describes Abuses of Deaf Mexican Trinket Sellers, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1997, at Al.
45. Id.
46. See infra Part II.C; see also Su, supra note 41, at 408-09 (discussing the tension
inherent in the role played by the El Monte workers in legal developments arising out of the
El Monte factory abuse).




51. The S-visa allows admission for up to three years for a noncitizen who receives such
certification. The Attorney General must also certify that the "alien" is willing to testify; and
that the "alien's" presence in the United States is essential to the criminal investigation. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(S), 1184(k)(3) (2000). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(j), the Attorney
General may adjust the noncitizen witness's status to that of legal permanent resident (a
precursor to citizenship) after three years, provided that he or she has provided information
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In the case of the Mexican trafficking ring, Alfredo Rustrian Paoletti and
his son, Renato Paoletti Lemus, both Mexican nationals, were charged with
violations of criminal provisions of the U.S. immigration laws prohibiting
the recruitment, smuggling, and harboring of "aliens. '' 52 Many of the
Mexican nationals who had been enslaved in their scheme also received S-
visa status, and were thus allowed to remain in the United States.53
In both of these pre-TVPA cases, there was a network of laws sufficient
for charging the perpetrators with crimes arising out of their acts of
trafficking. In both cases, however, there was general concern that
available criminal punishments would not be severe enough to fit the crime.
Furthermore, the victims in these cases had to fight their own detention and
win the right to remain in the country before they were able to secure their
own freedom, much less their protection. 54
At the very time that these two events demonstrated the shortcomings of
U.S. law for dealing with the problem of human trafficking, the
international community was working to develop its revised legal
framework for dealing with the problem. With attention focused on the
issue at home and abroad, Congress took action to address the problem of
human trafficking, and passed the TVPA on October 28, 2000.55
II. THE STRUCTURE AND ORIGINS OF THE TVPA
As previously noted, Congress passed the TVPA on October 28, 2000.56
The TVPA was a compromise bill, based on three bills introduced during
the legislative session. 57 The final version of the Act had broad bipartisan
support, passing by a vote of 371-1 in the House and 95-0 in the Senate.58
It was signed into law by President William Jefferson Clinton on October
28, 2000.59 The stated purpose of the final version of the Act is "to combat
trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose
that substantially contributes to the criminal investigation or prosecution. The S-visa is often
referred to as the "snitch visa." See, e.g., Abused Deaf Mexicans Allowed to Stay in U.S.,
News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), June 20, 1998, at A12.
52. On May 31, 2005, they were extradited by Mexico to the United States for trial,
more than seven years after their initial arrest in connection with this matter. See Mexico
Extradites Two Deaf Men in Immigration Scandal, Lawinfo.com, May 31, 2005,
http://blog.lawinfo.com/2005/05/3 1/mexico-extradites-deaf-men-accused-of-exploiting-
immigrants/. Their crimes predated the TVPA, so they were charged under 8 U.S.C. §
1324a. For further discussion of these anti-smuggling provisions, see infra Part II.A.
53. See Abused Deaf Mexicans Allowed to Stay in U.S., supra note 51, at A 12.
54. Su, supra note 41, at 407.
55. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 and 22 U.S.C.).
56. Id.
57. For detailed discussions of the similarities and differences of these three bills, see
Hyland, supra note 4, at 60-71 (including a discussion of the three bills, the conference
compromise, and the final Act); Jackson, supra note 4, at 518-19.
58. Bill Summary and Status for the 106th Congress,




victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims." 60
In enacting the statute, Congress included prefatory language containing
a finding that about 50,000 people were trafficked into the United States
every year. This number was based on a 1997 CIA estimate. 61 Congress
found that many of these individuals, trafficked through force, fraud, or
coercion, 62 were working not just in the sex industry, but also in other kinds
of forced labor, "involv[ing] significant violations of labor, public health,
and human rights standards worldwide." 63  Congress recognized that
existing laws often failed to protect these victims of trafficking, "and
because victims are often illegal immigrants in the destination country, they
are repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers themselves." 64
These findings appear to signal congressional recognition of the need to
change the relationship between the state and the victims of trafficking.
Rather than punishing those who are trafficked, the Act is apparently
intended to provide for the care and treatment of trafficking victims in
accordance with their status as victims of crimes. Thus, it includes specific
provisions to provide for their assistance in the United States. 65 This new
framework for the humane treatment of trafficking survivors was supposed
to be complemented by the prosecution of traffickers and by measures
aimed at preventing trafficking at its source. 66
Congressional action on the trafficking issue met with enthusiastic
support from the Executive Branch. President Clinton signaled his support
of the Act upon its passage.67 Although the measure was passed during the
final year of the Clinton Administration, President George W. Bush has
been a vocal supporter of the goals of the Act in both terms of his
presidency. Many high-ranking officials in the Bush administration have
lauded current anti-trafficking efforts. 68 Anti-trafficking efforts have even
60. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2000).
61. This estimate has been revised. See discussion supra notes 16-18.
62. 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(2).
63. Id. § 7101(b)(3).
64. Id. § 7101(b)(17).
65. 2003 State Department Report, supra note 17, § II.
66. See infra Part III.A.
67. Upon the passage of the TVPA, President Clinton issued a statement congratulating
Congress "on its bipartisan work to pass the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection
Act of 2000, which contains legislation to combat trafficking in persons, especially women
and children," and observing that the Act's initiatives "have been important priorities of my
Administration and I look forward to signing this bill into law." President William J.
Clinton, Statement on Passage of Anti-Trafficking Law at Chappaqua, New York (Oct. 11,
2000), available at http://canberra.usembassy.gov/hyper/2000/1012/epf403.htm.
68. See, e.g., John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., Remarks to the International Conference:
Pathbreaking Strategies in the Global Fight Against Sex Trafficking (Feb. 25, 2003),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/rm/17987.htm ("The Department of Justice
remains firmly committed to ensuring criminals who engage in human trafficking are
aggressively investigated, swiftly prosecuted, and severely punished .... [T]he Justice
Department works to ensure that victims of trafficking have the services they need from the
moment we encounter them."); Attorney General Gonzalez Affirms Justice Department's
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been linked with the campaign against terrorism that has been the
centerpiece of the current Administration's foreign policy agenda after
September 11, 2001. In a speech before the United Nations on September
23, 2003, President Bush dedicated a substantial portion of a speech
otherwise dedicated to discussions of international terrorism, the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
to a "humanitarian crisis spreading, yet hidden from view," by which he
was referring to the issue of human trafficking, particularly the forced
prostitution of women and children.69 In keeping with the tone of the rest
of his speech, which was aimed at the global threat of terrorism, Bush
referred to the phenomenon as "a special evil."'70
In short, both the Legislative and Executive Branches have indicated that
anti-trafficking efforts are important, and such efforts have been funded
accordingly. More than $82 million were allocated to anti-trafficking
efforts in the past fiscal year alone. 71
While there has been much discussion of trafficking, the issue has been
cast as a foreign problem with unfortunate domestic manifestations.
Perhaps as a consequence, domestic efforts to minimize human exploitation
have never truly mirrored the zeal of the anti-trafficking rhetoric. The role
of U.S. law in perpetuating trafficking simply has not been adequately
addressed.
Commitment to Battling Human Trafficking, Anti-Trafficking News Bull. (U.S. Dep't of
Justice Civ. Rights Div., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2005, at I [hereinafter April Bulletin] ("In a
February 28 speech at the Hoover Institution's Board of Overseers Conference, Attorney
General Alberto R. Gonzales pledged to 'move aggressively' in the battle against human
trafficking. Characterizing trafficking in persons as 'one of the most pernicious moral evils
in the world today,' he underscored that eradicating this form of modem-day slavery remains
a top priority of the Bush Administration.").
69. President George W. Bush, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly,
United Nations, New York, NY (Sept. 23, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030923-4.html.
70. Id. Nor did his enthusiasm for the topic taper off. On July 16, 2004, President Bush
remarked,
Human trafficking is one of the worst offenses against human dignity. Our nation
is determined to fight that crime abroad and at home....
The American government has a particular duty, because human trafficking is
an affront to the defining promise of our country. People come to America hoping
for a better life. And it is a terrible tragedy when anyone comes here, only to be
forced into a sweatshop, domestic servitude, pornography or prostitution.
President George W. Bush, Remarks Regarding First National Training Conference on
Human Trafficking in the United States: Rescuing Women and Children from Slavery (July
16, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/07/20040716-
11 .html. The President proceeded to berate Cuba as "a major destination for sex tourism."
Id. These comments exemplify a repeated theme: the conflation of legal prostitution, sex
tourism, and trafficking. See infra Part III.B.3.
71. [Amended] Letter from Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice Accompanying 2005
State Department Report (June 3, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2005/46605.htm. The amended letter revised the aid
figure down from $96 million to $82 million.
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A. The Timid Reforms: Revising and Supplementing Old Laws
Because slave-like conditions are at the core of the trafficking problem,
any effort to combat trafficking must address the issue of forced labor, and
Congress made some efforts to do so. The 2003 State Department Report
on trafficking states that the crimes that were added or altered by the Act
included forced labor; trafficking with respect to peonage; slavery;
involuntary servitude; sex trafficking of children; sex trafficking by force,
fraud, or coercion; and unlawful conduct with respect to documents. 72
While the 2005 State Department Report presents an impressive list of
changes to the criminal law wrought by the TVPA, in reality, the primary
changes were increases in criminal sentences for forced labor crimes that
were already in existence, including peonage, 73 operating vessels for slave
trade,74 enticement for slavery,7 5 sale into involuntary servitude, 76 and
forced labor. 77 Amplifying upon these preexisting laws, the Act also
codified a new definition of involuntary servitude78 and, importantly,
provided a private right of action for those who have been forced into
peonage, slavery, or involuntary servitude.79 The Act did not, however,
otherwise address the lack of adequate legal workplace protections for
undocumented migrants.
The Act also expanded the available tools for prosecuting individuals
who profit from forced labor even if they are not themselves the traffickers,
provided that they do so "knowingly." The Act added a new prohibition on
forced labor, which provides up to a twenty-year sentence for anyone who
"knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person" who has
been coerced into performing labor or services. 80 In addition to these
expansions of preexisting law, the Act also added a few new criminal
sanctions for trafficking-related conduct. Specifically, the TVPA expressly
criminalizes "trafficking" by legislating that any individual who
"knowingly recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any means,
any person for labor or services" in violation of the TVPA is subject to a
twenty-year sentence, or a life sentence if the victim is younger than
fourteen years old.8 1 And any individual who participates in or profits from
the trafficking of children for commercial sex purposes is subject to the
same sentences. 82 The Act also strengthens the government's hand against
third parties by adding human trafficking as a predicate offense to RICO. 83
72. 2003 State Department Report, supra note 17, § 11.
73. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1581 (West Supp. 2005).
74. Id. § 1582.
75. Id. § 1583.
76. Id. § 1584.
77. Id. § 1589; see also supra Part II.A.
78. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(5) (2000).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (West Supp. 2005).
80. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1589.
81. Id. §§ 1590, 1591(b)(1).
82. Id. § 1591(a).
83. Id §§ 1591, 1961(1)(A).
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The only other substantive change to domestic criminal law relates to
documents. Because the seizure of legal documents is often the means by
which victims are coerced into trafficking situations, the TVPA added a
provision rendering punishable by up to five years in prison the seizure of
another individual's governmental identification documents in the course of
violating involuntary servitude or trafficking provisions. 84
These provisions are the only "new" criminal provisions that were
created by the TVPA. The remainder of the Act increases penalties for
certain acts that were already criminalized: 85 increasing from ten to twenty
years the penalty for violating 22 U.S.C.'s prohibitions on peonage,
enticement into slavery, and sale into involuntary servitude; 86 allowing for
life imprisonment in cases involving murder, kidnapping, or aggravated
sexual assault;8 7 and mandating restitution 88 and forfeiture.89
In other words, although the TVPA has often been billed as a major
legislative breakthrough in domestic efforts to curb the problem of human
trafficking, the TVPA is largely a set of incremental changes to an
assortment of preexisting federal laws designed to address various elements
of the human trafficking problem, including human smuggling, forced
labor, and sex trafficking. Although the TVPA allowed for more seamless
application of these laws, insufficient attention was paid to making existing
laws more efficacious. The shortcomings of the preexisting legislation in
the areas of labor, immigration, and sex trafficking have reappeared in the
TVPA.
B. Labor: The Thirteenth Amendment and Workplace Protections
Although the United States is a country whose foundation rested in part
upon the institution of slavery, its laws have long contained numerous
express prohibitions on forced labor. Many of these laws have their roots in
the Thirteenth Amendment, which provides, "Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
84. Id. § 1592.
85. Scholars have heralded the increased sentences, noting that prior to the enactment of
the TVPA, the punishment for committing acts of trafficking, even acts of the most
egregious kind, were very light. See Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment:
Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 981, 1037
(2002); Hyland, supra note 4, at 49-50; Candes, supra note 4, at 572-73. As an expressive
matter, it seems clear that the increased sentences send an important message: Whereas,
before, victims of trafficking were treated as valueless outlaws, they now are ceded more
appropriate respect as crime victims and their traffickers are therefore punished. See Note,
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act, supra note 4, at 2199-2200 (theorizing that the
harsher penalties of the TVPA may serve an important expressive function). That said, it is
not clear whether the increased penalties are sufficient to deter crime, particularly given the
low number of convictions obtained to date. See infra Part III.B.2.
86. TVPAII § 112(a)(2) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1590).
87. Id. § 112(a)(l)(B) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581(a), 1583, 1584).
88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1593 (West Supp. 2004).
89. Id. § 1594(b), (c).
2006] 2993
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
place subject to their jurisdiction." 90 Others, including wage and workplace
protections, are rooted in Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 91
1. The Thirteenth Amendment and Ancillary Legislation
The Thirteenth Amendment has no state action requirement. 92 It places
legal limits upon private social and economic relationships. 93
Unfortunately, it is unclear how effectively the Thirteenth Amendment
itself could be deployed in anti-trafficking litigation because the U.S.
Supreme Court has not squarely determined whether, in the absence of
ancillary statutes, such action may be filed by a private actor against
another private actor.94  Only a few lower courts have accepted the
argument that the Thirteenth Amendment provides such a right of action.95
Because of ambiguities regarding the existence of a right of action under
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the legal force of the Amendment
mainly comes from Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, which gives
Congress "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. '96 A
wave of restrictive judicial interpretations during Reconstruction restricted
this ancillary legislation to laws aimed to prevent or end only the most
literal instances of "slavery. '97  These limitations on the Thirteenth
90. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1.
91. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see infra Part lI.A.2.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 942 (1988).
93. Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the Global
Economy, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 973, 977-78 (2002).
94. Id.; see also Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom:
A Legal History 89-91 (2004). For arguments supporting the existence of a private right of
action against private actors under the Thirteenth Amendment, see Azmy, supra note 85, at
1049-57 (arguing that the reasoning of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), supports such a right); Halem, supra note
40, at 417-18 (same). Although the TVPA initially failed to create a private right of action
for victims of trafficking, the 2003 reauthorization of the Act added a private right of action
for victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons. TVPAII § 4(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 108-193,
117 Stat. 2875, 2876 (2003) (to be codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1595).
95. See Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1997) (allowing a victim of
involuntary servitude to sue his masters directly for damages under the Thirteenth
Amendment); Terry Props, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986)
(recognizing a private right of action against a private defendant under the Thirteenth
Amendment). But see Doe v. Gap, Inc., No. CV-01-0031, 2001 WL 1842389, at *1 (D. N.
Mar. I. Nov. 26, 2001) (holding that plaintiffs could not sustain such an action); Turner v.
Unification Church, 473 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978) (same), affid, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir.
1979).
96. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 2.
97. In In re Slaughterhouse Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court declined Thirteenth
Amendment relief to white butchers in Louisiana seeking such relief against a Louisiana law
that granted a monopoly to a single slaughter company on the ground that the law violated
the Thirteenth Amendment by prohibiting them from engaging in a lawful occupation. 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 93 (1872); see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (holding
that the Thirteenth Amendment only prohibits involuntary servitude, and is not sufficiently
broad to punish private individuals for conspiring to deprive another person of the right to
enter into a contract, bring a suit or give evidence). The trend rejecting application of the
Thirteenth Amendment to cases involving economic and contractual labor freedom
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Amendment as a basis for regulating economic and contractual labor
freedom prompted lawmakers to rely instead on the Commerce Clause 98 or
the Fourteenth Amendment99 as a basis for laws designed to protect
workers from exploitation.
In spite of the limits on the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, several
ancillary laws prohibiting coercive labor practices did withstand
constitutional scrutiny. These included prohibitions on peonage and
involuntary servitude. In 1867, Congress used its Thirteenth Amendment,
Section 2, power to pass the Anti-Peonage Act. 100 The statute established
criminal penalties for holding or returning a person to a condition of
peonage. 101 The constitutionality of the Act was upheld in 1905 in Clyatt v.
United States,10 2 in which the Court held that the law prevented a creditor
from binding a debtor to service. 10 3 In Clyatt, the Court articulated a view
of Thirteenth Amendment protection that was refreshingly expansive. The
Court deliberately declined to consider the question of whether the
individuals had "voluntarily" entered into peonage arrangements.
"Peonage," the Court wrote, "is sometimes classified as voluntary or
involuntary, but this implies simply a difference in the mode of origin, but
none in the character of servitude .... [P]eonage, however created, is
compulsory service, involuntary servitude." 104
continued with the Civil Rights Cases, in which the Court held that the Thirteenth
Amendment did not provide Congress with the ability to legislate, as it had in the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States" were
entitled to access to private and public accommodations, transportation, and entertainment.
109 U.S. 3, 16 (1883). The Court reasoned that the Thirteenth Amendment did not apply to
"the social rights of men and races in the community," and concluded that to hold otherwise
would be "running the slavery argument into the ground." Id. at 22, 24; see also Tsesis,
supra note 94, at 62-74; Azmy, supra note 85, at 1006. This line of reasoning was brought
to bear again in Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 282 (1897). See Wolff, supra note 93,
at 977-78.
98. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
99. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
100. March 2, 1867 Act, ch. 187, §§ 1, 14, 14 Stat. 546 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1581
(2000) (prohibiting peonage in the Reconstruction era) and 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2000)
(abolishing peonage and nullifying acts or laws maintaining peonage)). When the United
States acquired the territory of New Mexico, a system of peonage was in place as a holdover
from Spanish rule. In 1867, Congress criminalized peonage in New Mexico and all other
parts of the U.S. with the federal Anti-Peonage Act. See Azmy, supra note 85, at 1020-21.
101. March 2, 1867 Act, ch. 187, §§ 1, 14, 14 Stat. 546.
102. 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
103. Id. at 216-18; see also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914) (reaffirming
the constitutionality of the Anti-Peonage Act under the Thirteenth Amendment); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240-42 (1911) (same). Bailey and Reynolds are jointly known as
the Peonage Cases.
104. Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215. Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff praises the Supreme
Court's decisions Clyatt and Bailey, because in finding that anti-peonage laws ought to
prohibit the conduct at issue in those cases, the Court "definitively rejected the assertion that
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The Supreme Court's analysis of the question of consent in Clyatt takes
the same approach as embodied in the U.N. Protocol insofar as it sidelines
victim consent as a relevant consideration. 105  In contrast, under the
domestic TVPA, the distinction between a legally protected trafficking
victim and a criminally smuggled undocumented worker now effectively
turns not on the conditions of the person's employment, but on the
"voluntariness" with which they entered into the employment
arrangement. 106
In addition to the anti-peonage law, U.S. law has also long contained
prohibitions on conspiring to interfere with an individual's Thirteenth
Amendment right to be free from "involuntary servitude,"' 1 7 and
prohibitions on "knowingly and willfully" holding another person "in
'involuntary servitude.""' 10 8  Unlike the anti-peonage provisions, the
involuntary servitude provisions have been read fairly narrowly by the
courts. For example, in a 1964 opinion in United States v. Shackney,10 9 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals set forth a narrow vision of involuntary
workers could bear complicity for their own enslavement by 'voluntarily' entering into
arrangements of power and dominance." Wolff, supra note 93, at 985.
105. See discussion supra notes 19-23.
106. See infra Part III.B. 1.
107. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2000). Section 241 authorizes punishment when "two or more
persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person.., in the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or because of his having so exercised the same." Id. Almost twenty-five years
prior to the passage of the TVPA, the provision was interpreted to create no substantive
rights, but rather, to establish prohibitions on interference with rights established by the
Federal Constitution or laws. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
108. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584 (2000). Section 1584 was enacted in 1948 as part of a
larger revision to the criminal code. It was a consolidation of the Slave Trade statute as
amended in 1909 (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 423), and the 1847 Padrone statute (formerly 18
U.S.C. § 1874). See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 946-47 (1988). The original
slave trade statute, Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 91, § 6, 3 Stat. 450, 452, authorized
punishment of any persons who "hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of, any... negro, mulatto,
or person of colour, so brought [into the United States] as a slave, or to be held to service or
labour." The 1909 amendment removed the racial restrictions, thus extending the statute to
the holding of "any person" as a slave. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 946-47. The Padrone statute
of 1847 took aim at Italian "padrones" who brought Italian boys to the U.S., putting them to
work in the streets. Id. at 947. The statute provided,
[W]hoever shall knowingly and wilfully bring into the United States... any
person inveigled or forcibly kidnapped in any other country, with intent to hold
such person.., in confinement or to any involuntary service, and whoever shall
knowingly and wilfully sell, or cause to be sold, into any condition of involuntary
servitude, any other person for any term whatever, and every person who shall
knowingly and wilfully hold to involuntary service any person so sold and bought,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony.
Id. (citing Act of June 23, 1874, ch. 464, 18 Stat. 251). Section 1583 prohibits the
kidnapping or carrying away of an individual with the intent to sell that person into
involuntary servitude or to hold them as a slave.
109. 333 F.2d 475, 486-87 (2d Cir. 1964).
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servitude-one which required the existence of physical violence, restraint
or immediate imprisonment. 1 0
The Supreme Court also hewed to a narrow interpretation of involuntary
servitude with its 1983 decision in United States v. Kozminski. 111 The
Kozminski holding was insufficiently attentive to the many types of coerced
labor that the Thirteenth Amendment and its ancillary statutes might be
designed to prevent." 2
In Kozminski, the Court wrote "two mentally retarded men were found
laboring on a Chelsea, Michigan, dairy farm in poor health, in squalid
conditions, and in relative isolation from the rest of society." ' 1 3  The
sexagenarians worked seven days a week, seventeen hours a day, first for
$15 a week, and later for no pay at all." 4 The government argued that the
men had been the victims of psychological coercion-that is, that they had
been coerced into working for the Kozminskis through a variety of
measures including "denial of pay, subjection to substandard living
conditions, and isolation from others. '' 115 The operators of the farm were
charged with conspiracy to deny the men their Thirteenth Amendment
rights 1 6 and with knowingly and/or willfully holding the defendants in
involuntary setvitude. '17
The Court determined that the phrase "involuntary servitude" previously
had been interpreted to extend to "those forms of compulsory labor akin to
African slavery which in practical operation would tend to produce like
undesirable results."' 18 From this, the Court reasoned that for purposes of
criminal prosecution, "the term 'involuntary servitude' necessarily means a
110. John M. Cook, Involuntary Servitude: Modern Conditions Addressed in United
States v. Mussry, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 153 (1984). Cook observes that a later Ninth Circuit
decision, United States v. Mussry, 726 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1984), offered a broader vision of
involuntary servitude that cognized other forms of coercion that might be used in the modem
economy. Cook, supra, at 157. The Supreme Court took this matter into its own hands,
however, in the case of United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
111. 487 U.S. at 931.
112. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 4, at 528 (The Supreme Court's attempt to narrow "the
concept of criminally prohibited coercion to the use of force or the threat of force, and its
attempt to eviscerate the concept of legal coercion by limiting it to instances in which state
statutes actually allowed criminal prosecution for a debt or breach of a labor contract, were
believed to make prosecution of human traffickers more difficult in several ways"); Stumpf
& Friedman, supra note 4, at 154-55 ("The Supreme Court in United States v. Kozminski
interpreted the involuntary servitude and peonage statutes conservatively .... As a result,
prosecutors had to establish coercion through force or threat of force. They could not reach
employers who used more subtle, albeit deliberate, forms of coercion to maintain control of
their victim."); Candes, supra note 4, at 588; see also Joey Asher, How the United States Is
Violating Its International Agreements to Combat Slavery, 8 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 215, 220
(1994) (arguing that the U.S. courts' interpretation of "involuntary servitude" was too
narrow to comply with international treaty obligations).
113. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 934.
114. Id. at 935.
115. Id. at 936.
116. Id. at 934.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 942 (citing Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)).
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condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the
defendant by the use or threat of... coercion through law or legal
process."" 19 This language in Kozminski suggests that courts might look to
a broad range of conduct in deciding whether coercion is present or absent
in any given circumstance. 120 But this generous language sat uneasily next
to the apparent prohibitions on consideration of psychological coercion
from the perspective of the victim. 12 1 It is not plainly evident that previous
interpretations of the term "involuntary servitude" had in fact been so
narrow. 
12 2
As the Kozminski decision lays plain, though, by the time the TVPA was
enacted, the Thirteenth Amendment was useful only in addressing the most
obvious forms of slavery, and even then, only where there was evidence of
certain kinds of coercion.
The TVPA might have revitalized the Thirteenth Amendment in two
ways. First, following the historical lead of the Supreme Court in Clyatt
and the contemporary example of the U.N. Protocol, the drafters of the
TVPA might have defined trafficking in such a way as to give central
importance to the coercion inquiry, rather than the victim consent inquiry,
in determining whether an individual was a victim of trafficking. In other
words, the Act could have focused on the conditions of the labor rather than
victim consent. As previously noted, it does not do so.
Second, the TVPA could have codified a more expansive definition of
coercion than the definition employed by the Court in Kozminski. In fact,
the Act purported to do just that. The House Conference Report on the
TVPA noted that the term "serious harm," used twice in the definition of
"coercion" 123 and again in the definition of "involuntary servitude,"'124 was
intended not only to cover physical violence and legal coercion, but also
more subtle methods of coercion, "such as where traffickers threaten harm
to third persons, restrain their victims without physical violence or injury,
119. Id. at 952.
120. The Court stressed that the "holding does not imply that evidence of other means of
coercion, or of poor working conditions, or of the victim's special vulnerabilities is
irrelevant." Id. The Court relied on this type of evidence in finding that there was sufficient
evidence of coercion in the record to remand the Kozminski case, rather than acquit the
defendants. Id. at 953.
121. Id. at 949.
122. See id at 955-59 (Brennan, J., concurring) (disputing the Court's interpretation of
the legislative history and concluding that the statutes at issue were meant to penalize many
types of coercion, not just physical and legal coercion).
123. 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2000) ("The term 'coercion' means-(A) threats of serious harm
to or physical restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause
a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical
restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.").
124. Id. § 7102(5) ("The term 'involuntary servitude' includes a condition of servitude
induced by means of-(A) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe
that, if the person did not enter into or continue in such condition, that person or another
person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (B) the abuse or threatened abuse
of the legal process.").
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or threaten dire consequences by means other than overt violence."' 25 The
term "serious harm" was meant to cover a wide array of harms, "including
both physical and nonphysical."'126 The Conference Report states that
known objective characteristics of the employee "such as youth, immigrant
status or mental retardation, are relevant to the determination of whether the
labor was obtained by forbidden means, since they may render the
individual especially vulnerable to coercion. '127
The TVPA thus codified the broad interpretation of coercion suggested
by the language, if not the holding, of Kozminski at 18 U.S.C. § 1589.128
Many heralded this provision of the TVPA as a marked evolution from the
understanding of "involuntary servitude" mapped out in Kozminski. The
real effects of the provision, however, are difficult to state. As a theoretical
matter, after all, the Supreme Court had already recognized in the
Kozminski decision the possibility of involuntary servitude effectuated
through either "physical or non-physical harms." The Court made specific
mention of the need to take into account the characteristics of the employee
that might render the employee particularly susceptible to coercion. 129
Thus, while the change ensured that the interpretation of involuntary
servitude would be as expansive as Kozminski would allow, it did not
notably increase the breadth of that decision's interpretation of involuntary
servitude.
If the TVPA does expand the definition of coercion, it is not clear that
this message is filtering down to the lower courts that are applying the law.
For example, in the recently decided case of Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,130 Wal-Mart and other defendants moved to dismiss claims brought
against them by a class of undocumented migrants under common law tort,
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 131 and RICO. 132 The
plaintiffs had raised involuntary servitude as one of many alleged predicate
125. H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 101 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 153 (1st Cir. 2004).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2000) provides, in relevant part,
[W]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person (1) by
threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person or another
person; (2) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person
to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor or services, that person or
another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or (3) by means of
the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Id.
129. See Note, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act, supra note 4, at 2197-98 ("In fact,
the Court acknowledged that 'evidence of other means of coercion, or of poor working
conditions, or of the victim's special vulnerabilities' was relevant in determining whether
there was sufficient physical or legal coercion to make out a § 1584 claim. And as an
example, it expressly included 'threatening... an immigrant with deportation' as a viable
type of legal coercion." (citing United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 948, 952 (1988))).
130. 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005).
131. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
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offenses for the RICO claim-a claim that was made possible when the
TVPA made involuntary servitude a predicate offense for purposes of
RICO. 133 But the court dismissed the RICO claims, finding insufficient
evidence of coercion. 134 That portion of the court's decision was based
entirely on case law that preceded the TVPA, and is devoid of any
discussion suggesting that the TVPA requires a more expansive
understanding of what constitutes involuntary servitude.
In short, the TVPA has only modestly expanded the legal parameters of
the concept of "coercion," while simultaneously codifying an approach to
forced labor that-contrary to earlier law-gives central importance to the
question of victim consent. With respect to Thirteenth Amendment-based
law, the TVPA appears to be a small step forward and a significant step
back.
2. The Commerce Clause and Workplace Protection
In light of historically crabbed interpretations of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Commerce Clause has served as an important basis for
legislation aimed at protecting workers. The Commerce Clause supplied
the constitutional authority for the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), 135 the FLSA, 136 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act of 1983 ("MSPA"). 137 All three of these statutes
regulate the conditions of the workplace-public and private-and provide
a scheme of criminal penalties and civil remedies for their enforcement.
While each of these three statutes provides some legal protection for
workers, none is well equipped to remedy conduct that amounts to
trafficking. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the protection of
these laws does not apply to many trafficking victims. The Fair Labor
Standards Act, which might be helpful for providing remedies to those who
have been forced to work for little or no pay, excludes agricultural and
domestic labor-two sectors that sweep in many exploited migrant laborers
and other trafficking victims. 138 The National Labor Relations Act is most
useful in unionized workplaces, 139 but the victims of trafficking are
133. TVPAII, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 5(b), 117 Stat. 2875, 2879 (2003) (to be codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)).
134. Zavala, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 312-13.
135. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
136. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000).
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (2000).
138. It does apply to manufacturing and service industry jobs.
139. National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") protection is not strictly limited to union
activity. See, e.g., Epilepsy Found. of Ne. Oh. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(extending to employees in nonunionized workplaces the right of an employee to have a co-
employee present in certain meetings with managers), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904 (2002);
NLRB v. Main St. Terrace Care Ctr., 218 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a rule
prohibiting employees from discussing their wages with each other violated the NLRA even
though the employees were not represented by a union). However, it does address particular
conduct more common in unionized workplaces.
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frequently neither organized nor on the road to becoming organized. The
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act is specifically
limited to certain workers. None of the Acts provide assistance to sex
workers, who are performing work that has been widely criminalized.
Second, these laws provide relatively light criminal penalties that are not
viewed as well suited to remedy the sorts of egregious conduct involved in
trafficking. 140  The FLSA, for example, only allows for fines and
imprisonment for six months. 141
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the undocumented noncitizen
workers who comprise the bulk of trafficking victims are themselves
unauthorized workers and, as such, are encountering greater and greater
obstacles in pursuing remedies under federal workplace protection statutes
and their state law analogues. The Supreme Court accelerated this trend
with its decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB. 142 In that
case, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") was
not authorized to award back pay to an undocumented worker who had been
subject, in violation of the NLRA, to retaliatory discharge for his union-
organizing activities. 143 A few district courts have applied the reasoning of
Hoffman Plastics to bar relief under the FLSA.144 Some state courts have
also applied the reasoning of Hoffman Plastic to preclude the award of state
court labor law remedies. 145
Thus, in addition to the logistical problems of obtaining representation,
finding resources to bring suits, struggling through language barriers in
court proceedings, 146 and sometimes dealing with issues of psychological
trauma, 147 undocumented migrants must also contend with the fact that they
140. Azmy, supra note 85, at 1036; Candes, supra note 4, at 581-82.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a).
142. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
143. Id. at 151-52.
144. See Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. Pa. J.
Lab. & Emp. L. 497, 503-04 (2004) (noting that district courts have applied the reasoning of
Hoffman Plastic in FLSA claims arising from an employer's retaliatory communications
with the (then) INS).
145. Id. (noting that some state courts are applying the reasoning of Hoffman Plastic to
state labor law remedies). But see Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1459-60 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (noting plaintiffs' state tort law claims of fraud, misrepresentation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, assault, and false imprisonment, as well as peonage and
involuntary servitude, various labor violations, RICO violations, and violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3), arising out of the El Monte factory case); Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Guzman, 116
S.W.3d 233, 245-47 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (permitting the award of state common law
remedies to unauthorized noncitizen workers). Baher Azmy argues that, while tort remedies
might redress trafficking wrongs, they "would not vindicate the important federal values
enshrined by the Thirteenth Amendment, nor do they communicate the appropriate level of
moral condemnation required by the Amendment's prohibition on such conduct." Azmy,
supra note 85, at 1038. Whether or not there is need for a remedy that performs an adequate
expressive function, the simple fact is that tort litigation has been a difficult road for
people-particularly noncitizens-who are trapped in slave-like conditions.
146. See generally Su, supra note 41.
147. See Sadruddin, Walter & Hidalgo, supra note 5, at 382.
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are ineligible for back pay awards and other compensation under the law
because of their undocumented status.
None of the Commerce Clause-based laws was addressed or amended by
the TVPA. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate that Congress even
considered these issues in debating the TVPA.
Even as the Supreme Court has limited the availability of Thirteenth
Amendment-based and Commerce Clause-based workplace protections,
these protections have been further constrained by the growth of contractual
arrangements designed to shield some employers from criminal liability.
For purposes of criminal liability under relevant statutory provisions, a
person must engage in the prohibited acts "knowingly." 148 When large
companies contract out to smaller companies to find and hire labor, this
knowledge is difficult to prove. The practice of subcontracting had its
origins in the turn of the century, as companies sought to avoid the costs
and liabilities of increasing labor regulations.' 49 For example, Bruce
Goldstein explains, "The historical shift from inside production work to
outside contracting work meant little in terms of the actual work performed
by the workers and who ultimately supervised and controlled the work.
Economically, it redounded to the benefit of the manufacturers who
shielded themselves from the labor costs and liabilities." 150
This practice is not limited to the manufacturing sector. It has also
played an influential role in structuring agricultural work. As Maria
Ontiveros has noted, "[t]he farm labor contractor system has grown
substantially since 1986. . . . By securing labor through a farm labor
contractor, the grower insulates himself from the legal (and, perhaps in his
mind, moral) responsibility for the workers." 151
Verizon Communications, Inc., recently denied any liability for unpaid
workers hired by one of its subcontractors. Twenty-three workers who dug
ditches for the laying of fiber-optic cable in Virginia allege that their
employer, Anthony Maxwell, failed to pay them thousands of dollars for
their labor. Maxwell had been hired by KCS Communications Inc., which
had in turn been hired by S&N Communications Inc., which had in turn
been hired by Verizon to oversee the installation of the fiber-optic cable in
parts of Northern Virginia. "'I certainly feel badly if workers weren't paid,'
said Verizon senior vice president for network services Chris Creager, but
'the responsibility lies directly with the person they are working for."' 152
Of course, their unpaid labor redounds to the benefit of Verizon.
148. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589-1592 (2000).
149. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 983,
998-99 (1999); Leti Volpp, Migrating Identities: On Labor, Culture, and Law, 27 N.C. J.
Int'l L. & Corn. Reg. 507, 514-15 (2002).
150. Goldstein et al., supra note 149, at 998-99.
151. Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons from the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 55
Me. L. Rev. 157, 163 (2003).
152. Elissa Silverman, Pay Fight in Tech's Trenches, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2006, at D01.
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Thus, the practice of contracting certain work out to smaller contractors
and making those contractors responsible for labor management, can shield
employers from criminal liability. 153 With the 2003 reauthorization of the
TVPA, Congress made an apparent attempt to address the impunity certain
employers enjoy as a consequence of their subcontracting policies by
expanding criminal penalties for trafficking to those who profit from the
labor of trafficking victims, provided that they do so "knowingly."154 But
the same argument of lack of knowledge that has shielded these employers
from liability under the labor laws in the past will continue to shield them
from criminal liability for acts of trafficking.
The only other significant step that the TVPA (as amended in 2003) takes
to increase labor protection for trafficked workers is the creation of a
private right of action allowing trafficking victims to seek damages and
attorneys' fees,155 and allowing victims access to free legal representation
in the pursuit of these claims.156 Nevertheless, recent legal developments
suggest that workers will still encounter heavy barriers when seeking legal
remedies under the TVPA. 157
At the same time that the TVPA has done little to increase protection for
exploited workers, immigration laws have exacerbated the problems of
many vulnerable immigrant victims.
C. Immigration: Prohibitions on "Alien" Smuggling
Although trafficking and smuggling are distinct concepts, anti-smuggling
laws are relevant to anti-trafficking efforts. Anti-smuggling laws were used
as one tool in prosecuting traffickers in cases that unfolded prior to the
enactment of the TVPA, 158 and they can still be used in prosecuting
trafficking cases that involve acts of smuggling.
Ironically, however, anti-smuggling enforcement over the past half
century has aggravated the trafficking problem, and continues to impede
153. See Goldstein et al., supra note 149, at 998-99; Ontiveros, supra note 151, at 163;
Volpp, supra note 149, at 514-15; see also Hyland, supra note 4, at 48-49 (noting that the
Mann Act, RICO, the MSPA and the FLSA all fail to afford an opportunity to prosecute
employers who use contractors and intermediaries to obtain and compel forced labor); infra
Part III.B.4 (discussing recent litigation involving Wal-Mart and Tyson Foods).
154. TVPAII, Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 4(a)(4), 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 (2003) (to be codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)).
155. Id. A civil remedy was initially included in the Smith-Gejdenson anti-trafficking bill
of 2000, but the Conference Committee removed it. 146 Cong. Rec. H8855, H8879 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 2000). See generally Kim & Hreshchyshyn, supra note 4.
156. This private right of action helps to fill the gap, noted by Azmy and others, which
was created through the lack of a widely accepted private right of action under the Thirteenth
Amendment. See generally Azmy, supra note 85. Of course, the right extends only to that
narrow class of individuals defined as "severe victims of trafficking in persons." So it is not
the same as a comprehensive Thirteenth Amendment private right of action, nor does it alter
the Supreme Court's narrow vision of the kinds of labor protected by the Thirteenth
Amendment.
157. See, e.g., Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005).
158. See supra Part I.C.
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solutions to domestic trafficking. There are two significant reasons for this.
First, anti-smuggling enforcement has placed a great deal of discretionary
authority into the hands of employers just as the labor law regime has
drastically reduced the legal protections available for noncitizens in the
workplace-a formula for encouraging the coercive labor practices at the
heart of human trafficking. Second, anti-smuggling efforts have privileged
border enforcement over principled internal enforcement efforts in ways
that also strengthen the hand of both human smugglers and human
traffickers.
1. Employer-Driven Internal Anti-smuggling Enforcement
Laws prohibiting the smuggling of unauthorized migrants have been on
the books since the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") was first
enacted in 1952.159 The statute prohibited individuals from bringing,
transporting, or harboring undocumented noncitizens in the United
States. 160  At the time of its enactment however, the INA expressly
excluded employment of an undocumented person from the definition of
"harboring an alien."'161
The decision not to treat employers as "harborers" signaled a complete
disregard for the role that employment opportunities play in drawing
migrants into the country. Unsurprisingly, migrants continued to enter the
country, but now, in greater numbers than before, they were "illegal."' 162
While workers present without authorization were entitled to some
protection under national labor laws, that protection was tightly
circumscribed as a result of their unlawful status. 163
159. Immigration and Nationality Act § 274, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 228-29 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2000)).
160. The statute, in relevant part, made punishable the efforts of
[a]ny person.., who... (3) willfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or shields
from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection ... or (4)
willfully or knowingly encourages or induces, or attempts to encourage or induce,
either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of any [undocumented]
alien .... Provided, however, That for the purposes of this section, employment
(including the usual and normal practices incident to employment) shall not be
deemed to constitute harboring.
Id.
161. Id.
162. Mai Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modem America
265 (2004). The lure of employment continued to generate a magnetic pull upon noncitizens
seeking a better life, even as fewer noncitizens qualified for legal entry into the United
States. Id. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also known as the Hart-Celler Act,
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.)) was seen as a liberalizing measure, but it, too, placed numerical restrictions on legal
immigration from the Western Hemisphere, which meant that the number of migrants,
particularly from Mexico, who came to be characterized as "illegal immigrants," continued
to climb after that "liberalizing" measure was passed. Id.
163. Although undocumented workers were prohibited by law from entering into and
working in the United States, they were generally viewed as entitled to at least some
protection under the NLRA. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
However, they were not entitled to the same monetary compensation as would be similarly
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In 1986, with the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
("IRCA"), 164 the conduct of employers who willfully or knowingly 165
employed undocumented workers 166 was criminalized for the first time.
Those who employed undocumented workers were no longer expressly
excluded from the definition of "harboring" an undocumented person for
purposes of criminal prosecution; the employer carve-out was written out of
§ 1324.167 The IRCA added new criminal penalties expressly applicable to
employers who employed undocumented workers; 168 employers were also
subject to civil penalties for employing such workers. 169
Congress's purported intent in enacting such reform was to take aim at
the incentive that prompted many migrants to come to the country in the
situated legal workers under the NLRA because they had to be deemed "unavailable" for
work during any period after they had been deported. Id. at 902-05. This ruling created
precisely the perverse incentive with which the majority had indicated it was concerned:
"Once employers, such as petitioners, realize that they may violate the NLRA with respect to
their undocumented alien employees without fear of having to recompense those workers for
lost backpay, their 'incentive to hire such illegal aliens' will not decline, it will increase." Id.
at 912 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Sure-Tan and subsequent INS policies
as they relate to domestic labor laws, see Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the
Workplace: The Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 345 (2001).
164. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
165. Early in the life of the IRCA, courts rejected the notion that actual knowledge was
required by the statute. See, e.g., New El Rey Sausage Co. v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153, 1157-58
(9th Cir. 1991) (adopting a constructive knowledge standard). Nevertheless, the same courts
were reluctant to infer constructive knowledge in the absence of very clear factual
predicates. See, e.g., Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1991)
(finding that the hiring of an employee over the telephone and failing to compare the back of
his social security card with an INS model provided an insufficient basis for concluding the
employer had constructive knowledge of the employee's ineligibility for employment). The
legislative history of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a supported this judicial reluctance to infer knowledge
or willfulness. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 61 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650. Thus, even after 1986, the Act had very little bite as applied to
employers. Employers faced only civil fines for hiring undocumented workers, and then,
only if, applying a reasonable person standard, the courts had no basis to infer constructive
knowledge that the employee was unauthorized to work in the United States. The true
penalty-criminal sanctions for the use of false documents--continued to be directed only at
the unauthorized employee. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 61; see also Collins Foods, 948
F.2d at 554-55.
166. After the IRCA, a worker is required to possess a valid "social security account
number card," 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(C)(i) (2000), or "other documentation evidencing
authorization of employment in the United States which the Attorney General finds, by
regulation, to be acceptable," id. § 1324a(b)(C)(ii), in order to be "authorized" to work in the
United States. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 & n.3
(2002).
167. 8 U.S.C. § 1324; see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 94 (indicating that the
amendment was included "to eliminate [the] proviso[] which prevents employment from
being considered as harboring an alien").
168. Employers may be fined up to $10,000 per violation for employing undocumented
noncitizens and may receive sentences of up to six months in prison if they demonstrate a
pattern of hiring undocumented noncitizens. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4).
169. Id.
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first place-the possibility of work. The House Report stated that the
purpose of the legislation was
to close the back door on illegal immigration so that the front door on
legal immigration may remain open. The principal means of closing the
back door, or curtailing future illegal immigration, is through employer
sanctions . ... Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this
legislation from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter
aliens from entering illegally or violating their status in search of
employment. 170
Although the IRCA ended the exemption of employers from the alien
smuggling provisions, the law placed a significant share of enforcement in
the hands of employers themselves. 17 1  The statute established an
employment verification system requiring an employer to execute an 1-9
form, attesting under penalty of perjury that it has verified that each
employee is not an undocumented noncitizen. 172  Under the IRCA,
employers were not even required to submit the 1-9 form to a federal
agency; they simply kept the documents on file. This meant there was no
real means by which the government systematically monitored the use of
false documents. 173
As a consequence of the virtually self-regulatory nature of employer
sanction provisions, the enforcement of anti-smuggling laws as against
employers-particularly large, well-established employers-has been
minimal.174 Disturbingly, to the extent that U.S. immigration officials have
targeted employers for investigation, this has often tended to occur in a
manner more effective in undermining labor protections than in punishing
lawless employers. 175 Given the small size of the penalties that they
face, 176 it is generally cost-effective for employers to simply continue to
170. H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46. The legislative history of the IRCA expressly
confirms that section 112 of that Act was enacted in order to "modify the existing law" and
"expand the scope of activities proscribed." H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 65 (discussing
section 112 of the IRCA).
171. See INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 & n.8 (1991);
New El Rey Sausage Co. v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 1991).
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b).
173. Nor has the situation changed greatly since the passage of IRCA. The Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.)
established a five-state pilot program of computerized verification of social security
numbers, mandated the development of counterfeit-resistant social security cards, and
required the standardization of birth certificates and drivers licenses. Id. § 657 (requiring the
Social Security Administration to harden the social security card). Through the present, the
employer continues to be the prime monitor of the legality of that employer's own
workforce.
174. See Nessel, supra note 163, at 359-61 (documenting the brief rise and almost
immediate end to serious employer sanctions efforts by the Justice Department).
175. Id. at 361-63.
176. The regulatory fines that accompany findings of IRCA violations are small enough
that they are often easily absorbed as a cost of doing business. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion
and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law,
1988 Wis. L. Rev. 955, 1015.
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hire undocumented workers and then refuse to provide such workers with
the wages and workplace safety guarantees that are afforded to citizens.
The Supreme Court decision in Hoffman Plastic, which severely
constrained undocumented workers' access to remedies under Commerce
Clause-based labor laws, has actually amplified these problems. In
Hoffman Plastic, the Court reasoned that back pay awards to undocumented
migrants "would unduly entrench upon explicit statutory prohibitions
critical to federal immigration policy," as expressed in the IRCA by
"encourag[ing] the successful evasion of apprehension by immigration
authorities, condon[ing] prior violations of the immigration laws, and
encourag[ing] future violations."1 77
Although IRCA enforcement has long drawn criticism for rendering
labor law protections a legal fiction for undocumented workers, 178 the
Hoffman Plastic decision ended even the pretense that undocumented
workers might be entitled to adequate remedies under the NLRA. Thus,
employers have an incentive to hire undocumented workers in violation of
immigration laws, to provide them with inadequate pay and workplace
protections in violation of labor laws, and to report them to immigration
officials when these workers attempt to organize or seek better working
conditions. 179 While the anomaly might at least arguably be addressed
through uniform and vigorous prosecution of employers who violate the
IRCA, enforcement measures have actually exacerbated the situation by
focusing enforcement efforts on undocumented workers who seek redress
for labor law violations. 180
This is precisely the type of legal regime in which forced labor thrives.
Indeed, years before the discussion on human trafficking took place on
Capitol Hill, Jennifer Gordon had diagnosed the ways in which the existing
legal regime actually exacerbated the exploitation of undocumented
workers, writing,
177. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002).
178. See generally Nessel, supra note 163.
179. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 912 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
For additional description and critique, see Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, Borderline
Decisions: Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the New Bracero Program, and the Supreme
Court's Role in Making Federal Labor Policy, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (2003); Robert I.
Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. Produce Disposable Workers?, 14
Berkeley La Raza L.J. 103 (2003); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected
World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 737 (2003).
180. See Nessel, supra note 163, at 350 ("While the INS currently gives lower priority to
worksite enforcement, its willingness to commence deportation proceedings based upon
information obtained through an unscrupulous employer's violations of labor law means that
the IRCA remains a powerful tool of exploitation."); see also Jennifer Gordon, American
Sweatshops: Organizing Workers in the Global Economy, Boston Rev., Summer 2005, at 1,
3-4, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR30.3/gordon.html (attributing the




In practice, employer sanctions empower employers to terrorize their
workers. Frequently, employers in the underground economy ignore
sanctions or accept false documents when they hire their workers. Later,
when immigrants attempt to organize or otherwise defend their rights,
employers suddenly "realize" that they must comply [with the IRCA], and
fire anyone who cannot provide valid documents to fill out an 1-9 form. If
the immigrants press matters any further, employers often threaten to turn
them into the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 
18 1
In other words, the anti-smuggling provisions, and the manner in which
they are enforced, actually created the ideal conditions for coercing labor
from migrants.
In enacting the TVPA, Congress purported to recognize the fact that
human trafficking is most successful in places where the victims of
trafficking feel unable to avail themselves of legal protection when they are
mistreated in their place of work. 182 Logically, any effort to address the
problem of forced labor would require the revision of either labor or
immigration laws to eliminate the gap between labor law rights and the
actual remedies available to undocumented workers. Indeed, one possible
legislative means for discouraging trafficking as manifested in migrant
labor exploitation would be to allow undocumented workers to claim the
full range of remedies available under the NLRA, the FLSA, and other
labor protections, and allowing undocumented migrants sufficient legal
protection to pursue those claims. Obviously, however, this solution was
political poison for those lawmakers who view such remedies as creating
incentives for "lawbreakers." 183
So labor protections for migrants were not addressed. Instead, the TVPA
took much more limited and indirect measures to address the workplace
protection problem that is at the heart of human trafficking. These
measures, which fail to address deep structural problems that encourage
domestic reliance on unprotected immigrant laborers, cannot possibly put
an end to forced labor given the existing structure of labor and anti-
smuggling laws.
181. Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, The
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 407, 414
n.27 (1995).
182. Paragraph 17 of the prefatory language of the Act states, "Existing laws often fail to
protect victims of trafficking, and because victims are often illegal immigrants in the
destination country, they are repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers
themselves." 22 U.S.C. § 7102(b)(17) (2000).
183. In reality, portraying workplace protection as an incentive for lawbreaking is flawed
because it overlooks the fact that such protections remove perverse incentives for hiring
undocumented workers. Thus, the primary beneficiaries are actually legal workers, who




2. Border-Centered Anti-smuggling Efforts
While the government has left internal workplace enforcement of anti-
smuggling laws in the hands of employers, it has turned its attention and
resources to interdiction efforts.184 These efforts reached a sort of zenith in
the mid- to late 1990s. 185 In August 1994, then-INS Commissioner Doris
Meissner approved a new national strategy for the Border Patrol under
which greatly expanded enforcement resources would be deployed in each
major entry corridor, and the Border Patrol would increase the number of
agents on the line and expand the use of technology in an effort to raise the
risk of apprehension high enough to be an effective deterrent. 186 A series of
regional enforcement efforts were initiated, including "Operation
Gatekeeper," initiated south of San Diego, California, in October 1994;
"Operation Safeguard," initiated in Arizona in October 1994; and
"Operation Rio Grande," initiated in Brownsville, Texas, in August
1997.187 As Professor Bill Ong Hing has summarized the plan, "[t]he idea
was to block traditional entry and smuggling routes with border
enforcement personnel and physical barriers."'
' 88
These border militarization efforts allowed government officials to
demonstrate their attention to immigration issues through sheer physical
presence and fiscal commitment.189 Nonetheless, these measures have not
been effective in preventing the flow of undocumented migration.
Although they seem to have some success in preventing migration at the
points of operation, the net effect seems to be a shift in migration away
from heavily guarded areas to the less guarded (and much more dangerous)
areas along the southern border. 190 Far from preventing trafficking, these
184. See generally Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling 'Unwanted' Immigration: Lessons
from the United States, 1993-2004, 31 J. Ethnic & Migration Stud. 775 (2005).
185. Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. &
Pol'y 121, 127-28 (2001).
186. Id. (quoting U.S. Border Patrol, Border Patrol Strategic Plan: 1994 and Beyond-
National Strategy 17 (1994); see also Peter Andreas, The Transformation of Migrant
Smuggling Across the U.S.-Mexico Border, in Global Human Smuggling, supra note 36, at
112-16.
187. Hing, supra note 185, at 128. The strategy behind these "Operations" stemmed from
an independent effort undertaken in the greater El Paso, Texas, area. Silvestre Reyes, then
regional Border Patrol supervisor (and now U.S. Congressman for the area), stationed his
agents in tight intervals along the U.S.-Mexico border and kept them there twenty-four hours
a day. Because it led to an immediate drop in border apprehensions, Congress began to
pressure the INS to undertake similar measures elsewhere. Id. at 128 n.25; see also Andreas,
supra note 186, at 114-15.
188. Hing, supra note 185, at 128.
189. Between 1993 and 1997, the INS budget for enforcement efforts along the southwest
border doubled from $400 million to $800 million, and the number of Border Patrol agents
along the southwest border increased from 3389 in October 1993 to 7357 by September
1998. Id. at 129.
190. Andreas, supra note 186, at 115; Cornelius, supra note 184, at 783 ("The main gates
for illegal entry in the pre-1993 period were the San Diego, California and El Paso, Texas
metropolitan areas, and the southern Rio Grande Valley in Texas. Apprehensions in these
now-heavily-fortified sectors have fallen by a combined sixty-four percent since 1993, while
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efforts actually cut against anti-trafficking initiatives. Increasing the cost of
migration, rather than deterring many migrants, simply drives them into the
arms of high-priced smugglers.191
In the past, hired smugglers-also known as coyotes-provided very
basic services. They led their clients across the border, whereupon the
contracted services ended. 192 As border security has increased, however,
the role of the smuggler has become far more complicated. As sociologist
Maggy Lee has written, services provided by the smuggler now often
include
passage out of a country of origin, a transit location or locations as the
case requires, and transport to a final destination. These services are
costly, and debts incurred leave migrants vulnerable to coercive labor
arrangements. Smugglers may subject migrants to much worse conditions
than they anticipated at the time of the agreement. 193
In other words, migrants are increasingly caught in coercive trafficking
arrangements as the border becomes more treacherous and crossing the
border becomes more costly.
Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that migrants are less likely to
return home as a result of border militarization; that is to say, migrants are
trapped within the U.S., not outside of it. 194 As people find themselves
trapped within the country, faced with increasing criminal penalties on
account of their presence, they are even more beholden to their employers,
again increasing the probability that these migrants will be subject to
exploitative arrangements.
In short, while anti-smuggling efforts logically would seem to
complement anti-trafficking efforts, enforcement of anti-smuggling laws in
the United States has followed a path that seems more likely to increase
rather than decrease the trafficking problem.
3. Changes to the Smuggling Laws
What does the TVPA do to alter the vulnerabilities of migrants created in
part by the immigration laws? After all, one of the three stated overarching
goals of the Trafficking Act is to provide protection for trafficking victims.
In order to do so, legislators recognized that at least some people who might
otherwise be classified as criminal under the smuggling provisions instead
ought to be classified as victims of crime. 195 Thus, the act created a
they have soared along the Arizona-Mexico border. The 260-mile Tucson sector has become
the leading corridor for illegal entry, accounting for 490,827 apprehensions (forty-three
percent of the south-west border total) in 2004"); Hing, supra note 185, at 130-44.
191. Andreas, supra note 186, at 116-20; Cornelius, supra note 184, at 779; Lee, supra
note 1.
192. Andreas, supra note 186, at 108.
193. Lee, supra note 1, at 7 (citations omitted).
194. Cornelius, supra note 184, at 782.
195. Even in its initial findings, however, Congress signaled the limits to such assistance,
stating that "[v]ictims of severe forms of trafficking should not be inappropriately
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category of people-victims of "severe forms of trafficking in persons"-
who would be eligible for protection under the Act, rather than punishment
and deportation for their unlawful entry, unauthorized employment, or both,
provided the illegal acts were a direct result of their being trafficked.196
For those individuals in the United States who are deemed to fall within
the TVPA's somewhat restrictive definition of a "victim" of "severe forms
of trafficking in persons," the Act offers certain special protections. First,
the TVPA provides for the grant of up to 5000 visas to the victims of
"severe forms of trafficking in persons." 197 T-visas allow the recipients to
stay in the United States, but only if they cooperate in the prosecution of the
individuals responsible for their trafficking, and can demonstrate that they
will be subject to "extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm" if
they are returned to their countries of origin. 198 After three years on a T-
visa, victims of trafficking may be able to stay in the United States
permanently, and to bring their spouses and children with them if they have
exhibited good moral character, and either have assisted in the investigation
or prosecution of traffickers or would suffer extreme hardship upon
removal. 199
In short, the TVPA eliminates the threat of deportation for up to 5000
"severe victims of trafficking in persons" where such persons are willing
and able to assist in the prosecution of their employers. In this way, the Act
seeks to eliminate the ability of employers to manipulate undocumented
workers by exploiting the vulnerability of these workers under U.S.
immigration law. Furthermore, the TVPA allows both the government and
the victims of "severe forms of trafficking in persons" themselves to seek
damages from traffickers. 200
This newly created remedy theoretically provides economic disincentives
for traffickers that are otherwise absent under the law. In practice,
incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct
result of being trafficked, such as using false documents, entering the country without
documentation, or working without documentation." 22 U.S.C. § 7102(b)(19) (2000).
196. See supra Part IIA-B.
197. The cap of 5000 visas each year is contained at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(n)(2) (2000). The
spouses, children, and eligible parents (if the trafficking victim is under twenty-one) of the
T-visa recipient do not count against the 5000 visa cap. Id. § 1184(n)(3). Nevertheless, the
number of T-visas authorized by the statute clearly falls well below the number of estimated
trafficking victims in the country. Because there does not appear to be any principled basis
for the cap, and because the cap seems to belie Congress's seriousness in addressing the
needs of trafficking victims, it has been roundly criticized. See 146 Cong. Rec. H7628,
H7629 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2000) (statements of Rep. Watt and Rep. Lofgren); 145 Cong.
Rec. H2674, H2687 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Conyers) ("Because
estimates of the number of trafficking victims entering the United States are greater than
5000 per year, we see no reason not to provide protection to the 5,001st who has been the
subject of such terrible acts."); see also Jackson, supra note 4, at 556-57; Sadruddin, Walter
& Hidalgo, supra note 5, at 391-94. The number of T-visas issued to date has come nowhere
near the 5000 cap.
198. 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(15)(T)(IV), 1184(n)(2).
199. Id. § 1255(l)(1).
200. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1595 (West Supp. 2005).
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however, these small changes cannot hope to counterbalance the incentives
for abuse that lie at the intersection of U.S. labor and immigration laws.
This is particularly true because Congress defined T-visa eligibility so
narrowly that it potentially excludes bona fide trafficking victims.
Furthermore, there has been little concerted effort to focus on these aspects
of the trafficking problem because the majority of rhetorical and
enforcement efforts have been focused, not on forced labor, but on sex
trafficking.
D. Prohibitions on Sex Trafficking
Even before the law prohibited human smuggling, there were laws to
prohibit certain forms of sex trafficking. These laws were, at base, anti-
immigrant measures dressed in a cloak of morality. The TVPA is, in
distressing ways, proving to be an heir to this tradition. Most of the
provisions of the TVPA aimed at offenses relating to sex trafficking are not
new. The offenses of knowingly transporting a person with the intent that
such person will engage in illegal sexual activity, 20 1 engaging in coercion
and enticement,20 2 engaging in the transportation of minors, 20 3 and failing
to file the requisite filing factual statements about the entry of "aliens ' '20 4 all
existed prior to the passage of the TVPA.
The Alien Prostitution Importation Act of 1875, also known as the Page
Law, was the first law enacted by Congress to address the problem of sex
trafficking.20 5 The 1875 Page Law prohibited the importation of noncitizen
women for purposes of prostitution, and included criminal penalties of up to
five years imprisonment or $5000 in fines. 206 The apparent moral agenda
was intertwined with an anti-immigrant agenda: The law was designed as a
means of excluding Chinese immigration at a time when the Burlingame
Treaty expressly precluded such exclusion. 20 7 As Professor Kelly Abrams
has written, "[t]he Page Law "was the first restrictive immigration law
passed in direct response to the desire to exclude a particular group of
people, and it did so by purportedly protecting the institution of
monogamous marriage against a dangerous system of polygamy and
prostitution." 208
With the advent of the Progressive Era, and in the face of a rising tide of
immigration at the turn of the century, Congress brought new zeal to
201. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000).
202. Id. § 2422.
203. id. § 2423.
204. Id. § 2424.
205. Alien Prostitution Importation Act, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875) (amended 1903).
206. Id.
207. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 641 (2005).
208. Id. at 702.
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addressing moral issues such as prostitution.20 9 The result was renewed
attention to and revisions of the Alien Prostitution Importation Act, and
ultimately, the enactment of the Mann Act.210 In 1910, Congress enacted
the Mann Act, also known as the White Slave Traffic Act.2 11 The Mann
Act was passed based in part upon a report by the Commissioner General of
Immigration concerning the suppression of the "White Slave Traffic,"
which was transmitted to the Congress by President William H. Taft in
response to a December 7, 1909, Senate resolution. 212 The report estimated
that there were over 100,000 prostitutes of alien origin in the United States,
and several thousand pimps. The report indicated that state and local
governments were unable to control the thriving interstate traffic of
prostitution, which the report argued was fed by a group of professional
procurers who met immigrant girls at Ellis Island and lured them into
brothels. 213
On December 10, 1909, Congress's Immigration Commission, chaired by
Senator William P. Dillingham of Vermont, submitted testimony to
209. For a helpful summary of the moral debate over the issue, see Marlene D. Beckman,
Note, The White Slave Traffic Act: The Historical Impact of a Criminal Law Policy on
Women, 72 Geo. L.J. 1111, 1115-17 (1984).
210. These efforts began in 1903 when the Alien Prostitution Importation Act was
expanded to cover "girls" in addition to "women." Alien Prostitution Importation Act, ch.
1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903) (amending the Alien Prostitution Importation Act, ch. 141, 18
Stat. 477 (1875)). U.S. efforts to address these issues proceeded in tandem with international
action. In 1904, the International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic
was completed. Six years later, the 1910 International Convention for the Suppression of
White Slave Traffic was completed. As with domestic legislation, international efforts
focused not on forced labor generally, but on the much narrower issue of procuring women
or girls for immoral purposes abroad. Bruch, supra note 6, at 8-10. Bruch writes, "The
international agreements took a predominantly abolitionist approach to prostitution and were
typically limited to issues of law enforcement and cooperation." Id. at 11.
211. White Slave Traffic Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2000)). The term "white slavery," which was the source of the title of
the Act, is of disputed origin. The term might be an abbreviation of the French term "Traites
des Blanches" (trade in whites), which was used at an international conference of fifteen
European nations that was held in 1905 to discuss the problem of international trafficking in
women and children. See Vern L. Bullough, Prostitution: An Illustrated Social History 245
(1978). Other sources conclude that the term was popularized by an article in McClure 's, a
popular magazine among Progressives at the turn of the century. In a 1907 article, George
Kibbe Turner claimed that a "loosely organized association.., largely composed of Russian
Jews," operating with the aid of corrupt officials, supplied the prostitutes for Chicago
brothels. A Chicago prosecutor, Clifford G. Rose, reportedly recovered a written message
thrown from a brothel by a young prostitute who described herself as a "white slave." See
Alan M. Kraut, Prostitution and "White Slavery": 1902-1933, in 5 Records of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Series A: Subject Correspondence Files (1996),
available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/academic/guides/immigration/ins/insa5.asp.
Because the terms "white slavery" and "white slave trade" do not accurately define the
problem the Act addressed, this Article will refer to the law as the "Mann Act" rather than
the "White Slave Trade Act."
212. International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic, May 18,
1904, 35 Stat. 1979, T.S. No. 496.
213. U.S. Immigration Comm'r, Importing Women for Immoral Purposes: A Partial
Report from the Immigration Commission on the Importation and Harboring of Women for
Immoral Purposes, S. Doc. No. 61-196, at 3 (1909).
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Congress that referred to the importing and harboring of women and girls
for immoral purposes as "the most pitiful and revolting phase of the
immigration problem." 214 Eleven days later, the Mann Act was reported
from committee. 215 Representative James Robert Mann, the Act's chief
sponsor, was careful to note that the Act was not intended to impinge on the
police powers of individual states to regulate prostitution and other moral
vice. 216 Rather, he clarified that the Act was intended to apply to the
interstate transportation of women against their will.217 The Act provided
that
any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, or
aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate
or foreign commerce ... any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution
or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or
purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman or girl to become a
prostitute or to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other
immoral practice... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 218
Although there was a tremendous panic about "white slavery" at the time
of the passage and early enforcement of the Mann Act provisions, the
framers of the law generally misapprehended the problem. Some
contemporary historians have concluded that the problem of "white
slavery," as defined to involve an "innocent" victim coerced into sex work,
was virtually nonexistent. 219 While it is true that the number of prostitutes
of foreign origin was on the rise, many of the women involved had made a
deliberate choice to engage in sex work. 220  Although coercion was
sometimes involved, this tended to relate to the conditions, not the nature,
214. Id.
215. H.R. Rep. No. 61-47 (1909).
216. Id. at 1-2.
217. Representative James Robert Mann stated that the term "white slave" only applied to
"those women and girls who are literally slaves-those women who are owned and held as
property and chattel." Id. at 10-11. In other words, it was intended to address the "innocent"
victim. Theoretically, states were left to regulate the voluntary prostitution and vice as they
saw fit. Id.; see also Beckman, supra note 209, at 1117-18.
218. White Slave Traffic Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825, 825 (1910).
219. Jo Doezema, Loose Women or Lost Women: The Re-emergence of the Myth of
'White Slavery' in Contemporary Discourse of 'Trafficking in Women', 18 Gender Issues 23,
23-50 (2000), available at http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/doezema-loose.html (citing
Edward J. Bristow, Prostitution and Prejudice: The Jewish Fight against White Slavery
1870-1939 (1982); Alain Corbin, Women for Hire: Prostitution and Sexuality in France
After 1850 (Alan Sheridan trans. 1990); Donna J. Guy, Sex and Danger in Buenos Aires:
Prostitution, Family and Nation in Argentina (1991); R. Rosen, The Lost Sisterhood:
Prostitution in America, 1900-1918 (1982); Judith R. Walkowitz, Prostitution and Victorian
Society: Women, Class and the State (1980)) (paper presented at the International Studies
Convention, Washington, D.C., Feb. 16-20, 1999); see also Ariella R. Dubler, Immoral
Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 Yale L.J. 756, 766 n.29 (2006) (noting
that the question of the scope of the so-called white slave trade was contested even in the
early twentieth century).
220. Doezema, supra note 219, at 29-31.
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of the work. 22' Nevertheless, the trope of the "white slave" became a
powerful force behind the passage and enforcement of the Mann Act. 222
The debate around the Mann Act indicates that in passing the Act,
Congress had something more in mind than simply stopping sex trafficking.
Efforts to address the "white slavery" problem were inextricably
intertwined with two other, more general concerns. First, they drew from
and fed the debate over sexual morality, and particularly abolitionist efforts
aimed at prostitution.223 Second, as with the Page Law, 224 the "white
slavery" debate also reflected, and helped to feed, the rising anti-immigrant
sentiment of the time. 22 5
Just as the Mann Act debate revealed a preoccupation with something
much broader than sex trafficking, it soon became clear that the
enforcement of the Mann Act would extend beyond the parameters of the
plain language of the law. Soon after its enactment, the Mann Act was
applied to men and women traveling together even where there was no
evidence that there was a commercial component to their interaction, and no
evidence that the women had been coerced into traveling with the men.226
While the language and the legislative history of the Mann Act thus suggest
that it was meant to apply to situations in which women were commercially
trafficked against their will, increasingly over time, women were prosecuted
under the Mann Act.227 This result was at odds with the stated intent of the
Mann Act, which was to protect immigrant women from interstate
trafficking, not to serve as a tool to penalize prostitution or other moral
vices.228 From 1919 through 1929, in spite of circulars issued by the
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 27-28.
224. See generally Abrams, supra note 207.
225. Suzanne Jackson writes,
As immigration to the United States increased to unprecedented levels, legislative
proposals to impose new restrictions on immigration multiplied, and again focused
upon prostitution. As Nancy Cott described it:
A national hysteria over the international "traffic in women" was in the
making .... Congressmen expended fulsome prose on the "soul-harrowing
horrors" of the traffic .... Despite ... contradictory evidence, policy-makers
painted sex trafficking in simplistic, lurid tones, exploiting and fueling
already strong anti-immigrant and anti-prostitute stereotypes.
Jackson, supra note 4, at 488-89 (quoting Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of
Marriage and the Nation 146 (2000)).
226. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (applying the Mann Act to
a Mormon who, in practicing polygamy, had frequently transported his plural wives across
interstate lines); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (applying the Mann Act in
a case in which two women accompanied two men on a trip from California to Reno,
Nevada, for the weekend).
227. See, e.g., Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932) (holding that a woman who
provided active assistance in her own transportation could be found guilty of conspiracy to
violate the Mann Act); United States v. Holte, 236 U.S. 140 (1915) (holding that a woman
could not be liable as an accomplice to a Mann Act violation, but could be indicted for
conspiracy).
228. See Beckman, supra note 209, at 1118-24.
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Department of Justice advocating the enforcement of the Mann Act only in
situations involving commercialized vice and an unwilling participant,
United States attorneys continued to prosecute individuals engaged in
personal sexual escapades that involved neither commercial gain nor the
exploitation of innocent victims. 229
Enforcement of the Mann Act during this time also maintained a
distinctly racial nature. The term "white slavery" is not accidental. Much
of the zeal for the Mann Act arose out of growing concern with prostitution
among white women; this was accompanied by the sense that white women,
as opposed to women of color, would never willingly engage in acts of
prostitution, and therefore must be "enslaved" innocent victims.230 The
innocence of the posited "white" female victim was also contrasted against
the evil nature of her trafficker. In both Europe and the United States,
"foreigners," especially immigrants, were targeted as responsible for the
traffic.231  Given the important role that racial rhetoric played in the
drafting and passage of the Mann Act, it is not at all surprising that it was
also frequently used by police as an excuse not only to arrest immigrant
prostitutes, but also to persecute black men traveling or associating with
white women. 232
With the end of mass migration that accompanied the start of World War
I, the number of women migrating to the U.S. declined, and not
coincidentally, the issue of "white slavery" faded from prominence in the
public mind.233 Nevertheless, Mann Act prosecutions continued throughout
the twentieth century and into the new millennium. In fiscal year 2001, 153
people were sentenced to prison under Mann Act offenses.234 Many of
these recent Mann Act prosecutions are human trafficking prosecutions.
The Mann Act has simply been integrated into other anti-trafficking
measures through the TVPA without substantive revisions. The TVPA
does little to change the Mann Act provisions. The TVPA simply adds two
new weapons to the anti-trafficking arsenal: It expressly criminalizes
"trafficking" and "sex trafficking of children by force, fraud or
229. Id. at 1123. It was perhaps in response to these excesses that, in 1944, the Supreme
Court required the prosecution to show that immoral purpose was the "dominant motive" of
interstate movement in any Mann Act prosecution. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S.
369, 374 (1944).
230. Beckman, supra note 209, at 1123.
231. Doezema, supra note 219, at 30-31 (citing Bristow, supra note 219; Frederick K.
Grittner, White Slavery: Myth, Ideology and American Law 96-102 (1990); Nat'l Vigilance
Ass'n, The White Slave Traffic (1910)). Jews in particular were singled out for blame, and
traffickers were depicted in an anti-Semitic light. Id.
232. See Grittner, supra note 231, at 96-102; David J. Langum, Crossing over the Line:
Legislating Morality and the Mann Act (1994). For an anecdotal discussion of a blatantly
racist application of the Mann Act, see Geoffrey C. Ward, Unforgivable Blackness: The
Rise and Fall of Jack Johnson 334-38 (2004); see also Kevin R. Johnson, The Legacy of Jim
Crow: The Enduring Taboo of Black-White Romance, 84 Texas L. Rev. 739 (2006)
(criticizing the prosecution of black boxer Jack Johnson under the Mann Act as an example
of pretextual prosecution commonly used by prosecutors).
233. See Doezema, supra note 219, at 42-43.
234. 2003 State Department Report, supra note 17, § III.D.2.
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coercion." 235 Generally, however, as with the other forced labor provisions,
the Act represents only an increase in the harshness of criminal penalties for
actions already criminalized.
While the passage and publicity of the TVPA brought trafficking issues
into much greater focus, Congress did not systematically revisit the
shortcomings of the Mann Act. Their failure to do so has allowed old
problems to replicate themselves in contemporary anti-trafficking efforts.
Specifically, the TVPA, like the anti-trafficking laws that preceded it,
continues to operate more powerfully as a platform for antiprostitution
efforts than actual anti-trafficking efforts, and, moreover, the law is
enforced in a way that reflects and fuels anti-immigrant sentiment.
III. ASSESSING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TVPA
While instrumental in bringing to public attention the gravity of the crime
of human trafficking, the TVPA has failed to significantly address the ways
in which existing laws may actually promote trafficking and other labor
exploitation. The exploitation of immigrant workers is still rampant.236
Yet only a small number of people in the United States have received help
under the TVPA. Meanwhile, the fact that the Act exists, and that millions
of dollars are spent to combat trafficking each year, diverts political
pressure from the task of changing the legal regime to eliminate legal
incentives for the exploitation of human beings.
A. Modest Changes, Modest Improvements
In light of the apparent widespread political support for the TVPA from
both the legislative and executive branch, one would expect at a minimum
that the TVPA would serve as an effective tool in rooting out the most
blatant forms of human trafficking. However, widespread political support
for the TVPA translated into only modest changes to existing laws. Those
laws, in turn, create certain incentives that undercut anti-trafficking efforts.
It is therefore unsurprising that in every area from protection to prosecution
to prevention, the Act has fallen short of its promise.
1. Modest Strides Made in Protecting Trafficking Victims
One of the three stated overarching goals of the Trafficking Act is to
provide protection for trafficking victims.237 In certain cases, victims of
trafficking in the United States are able to apply for temporary visas, certain
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2000).
236. See, e.g., Human Rights Ctr., Univ. of Ca. Berkeley, Freedom Denied: Forced Labor
in California 1 (2005), available at
http://www.hrcberkeley.org/download/freedomdenied.pdf (identifying fifty-seven forced
labor operations in almost a dozen cities in California between 1998 and 2003, involving
more than five hundred individuals from eighteen countries).
237. See supra Part II.
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benefits, and even legal permanent resident status. To date, however, very
few victims have received any of these forms of assistance.
Between the passage of the Act in late 2000 and June 2003, the
Department of Homeland Security had received only 453 T-visa
applications. 238 Of the 453 T-visa applications, only 172 had been granted,
thirteen were denied, and 238 were pending. 239 In fiscal year 2004, the
Department of Homeland Security received 520 applications for T non-
immigrant status, approved 136, denied 292, and, as of July 2005,
continued to consider ninety-two. 240 In short, as of the end of 2004, fewer
than 500 people had received T-visas. 24 1
The number of people who had been certified by the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS") as eligible for services as victims of
trafficking was also stunningly low. The combined number of certifications
and eligibility letters issued by HHS for the four fiscal years following the
enactment of the TVPA was 611.242
In its 2003 report, the State Department attributed much of the shortfall
to a failure in "outreach. '243 Specific measures were enacted after 2003 to
improve outreach efforts. In addition to maintaining a toll-free hotline for
victims, 244 HHS implemented a $2 million effort to identify and serve more
trafficking victims through public service announcements and training of
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). 245 As of February 2003, the
HHS had awarded over $4.6 million in grants to twenty-two organizations
for outreach and services geared toward trafficking victims, and in March
2003, HHS issued approximately $3.5 million to fifteen organizations to
assist them in providing for the needs of trafficking victims such as
temporary housing, education, living skills, and transportation. 246 In some
cases, assistance includes mental health counseling, assistance in finding
employment, and specialized foster care for children. 247  While these
services were reserved for the "certified" victims of trafficking, $9.5 million
in grant money was also made available to various NGOs for emergency
services for victims as soon as they have been encountered. 248
In addition, funds were allocated to train not only federal law
enforcement officials on issues of trafficking, but also to inform state
238. 2003 State Department Report, supra note 17, § III.C.
239. Id.
240. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 244.
241. Even taking the lowest estimates, about 45,000 victims of trafficking would have
entered the United States from 2000 to 2003, and this number would have been in addition to
the victims of trafficking already present. Id.
242. Id. at 241.
243. 2003 State Department Report, supra note 17, § III.C.5.
244. This hotline provided the leads for about fifty percent of the trafficking
investigations undertaken between 2000 and 2003. Id.
245. Id.





officials of the implications of the Act. 249 And Congress has mandated that
the Legal Services Corporation provide legal assistance to trafficking
victims.2 50
But the 2005 State Department Report indicated that these efforts have
not substantially increased the number of victims assisted by TVPA-based
programs. The simple fact remains that, of the estimated number of
trafficking victims who enter the country each year-a number that ranges
from 14,500 to 50,000, not counting those already present 25 I-fewer than
1000 people received HHS certification and T-visa protection during the
first four years of the Act's existence.2 52
2. Modest Increases in Prosecutions
The Act does not significantly expand or revise preexisting criminal
prohibitions on sex trafficking and forced labor.25 3 Rather than create a
comprehensive criminal prohibition on trafficking, the law adds another
piece to the "patchwork" of trafficking-related criminal violations. 254 Thus,
it should come as little surprise that only thirty-two trafficking cases were
filed between 2001 and 2003, and of those thirty-two cases, eleven alleged
violations of laws that existed prior to the passage of the TVPA. 255 The
low number of prosecutions reflects the fact that, although penalties for
trafficking have increased, the chance of being prosecuted for trafficking
offenses is still quite low, undermining the deterrent value of the harsher
sentences.
256
As of March 2003, there were only 128 open trafficking
investigations. 25 7 This was twice the number of cases as had been open in
January 2001,258 but it is nevertheless a small number. In fiscal year 2004,
the Department of Justice initiated prosecutions against fifty-nine
traffickers. 259  Only thirty-two of those defendants were charged with
violations under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.260 All of
those cases involved sexual exploitation. 2 6 1
Of course, the prosecution of trafficking cases is extremely difficult, due
to the multinational nature of some of the crime rings, the language
differences that exist between victims and prosecutors, and the severe
249. Id. § III.D.3.
250. Id. § III.C.1.
251. See supra notes 16-17.
252. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 241.
253. See supra Part I1.C.3.
254. Note, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act, supra note 4, at 2198.
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trauma suffered by the witnesses. 262  Furthermore, these figures do
constitute an increase in the prosecution of sex and labor trafficking
prosecutions when compared to the numbers prior to the enactment of the
TVPA. As the State Department proclaimed in June 2005,
In the past four fiscal years (2001-2004), the Department of Justice has
initiated more than three times the number of investigations (340 vs. 106),
filed almost four times as many cases (60 vs. 16), charged more than
twice as many defendants (162 vs. 69), and doubled the number of
defendants convicted (118 vs. 59) than in the prior four year period.263
Nevertheless, given the estimated scope of the problem, these numbers
remain troublingly low.
3. Prevention: Gains and Losses Internationally
The TVPA also mandates the establishment of programs designed to
deter trafficking through the creation of positive financial alternatives to
potential trafficking victims.264 During fiscal year 2004, the United States
provided $82 million to foreign governments and NGOs in an effort to fight
trafficking on the international level.265 While the international economic
programs designed to fight trafficking are certainly commendable, these
economic incentives are tiny in comparison to the massive problems of
poverty and exploitation that give rise to trafficking. The State Department
estimates that the trafficking industry is a $9.5 billion a year industry.2 66
And while modest victories have been scored, international trafficking
seems to be on the rise, not on the decline.
Pursuant to the TVPA, all countries that receive foreign assistance from
the U.S. prepare reports regarding their own anti-trafficking initiatives, the
treatment of trafficking victims under their laws and practices, and the
countries' own cooperation with international trafficking efforts.
267
Countries that are deemed noncompliant with anti-trafficking efforts may
be sanctioned. Although the sanctions provisions were widely debated,
they are largely irrelevant at the moment. President Bush has been slow to
order sanctions, and in fiscal year 2004, no country was sanctioned for its
failures to meet the requirements of the Trafficking Act.
268
B. Diagnosing the Failures, or How History Repeats Itself
Because the TVPA was not passed on a blank slate, the limitations of the
preexisting laws aimed at coerced labor, including sex work, and migrant
exploitation ought to have been systematically evaluated as part of the
262. Id.
263. Id. at 243.
264. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005).
265. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 243.
266. Id. at 13-14.
267. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151(0.
268. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 69.
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process of enacting the TVPA. Had such an evaluation taken place, several
systemic problems would have been clear. First, migrants caught in
exploitative labor situations were further isolated and endangered by their
presumptive criminality. Second, the prosecution of those who exploited
migrants frequently took priority over protecting the victims of exploitation.
Third, more prosecutorial energy and attention was lavished on stamping
out prostitution than on eliminating coercive labor practices both in and out
of the sex industry. Fourth, "sex traffickers" were depicted as men who
were "foreign" (or racially "other") who sought to exploit innocent victims.
Finally, immigration control efforts that focused on interdiction rather than
on internal enforcement and outreach further isolated the victims of
coercive labor arrangements. As the preceding discussion demonstrates, all
of these were features of the legal landscape prior to the passage of the
TVPA. Dishearteningly, all of them persist.
1. Unprincipled Limitations in Defining "Victims"
The U.N. Protocol clearly indicates that if exploitative conditions exist,
the victim's consent at some stage of her trafficking does not mean that the
individual is not a trafficking victim.2 69 In contrast, the TVPA says nothing
on the issue of victim consent. In light of Congressional silence on this
issue, those charged with the enforcement of the TVPA could take an
expansive view of trafficking-one which focuses on conditions of
exploitation rather than upon the question of whether the apparent victim
"consented" to that exploitation. The 2005 State Department Report
actually advocates this approach to trafficking-at least in the global
context-explaining,
The means by which people are subjected to servitude-their recruitment
and the deception and coercion that may cause movement-are important
factors but factors that are secondary to their compelled service. It is the
state of servitude that is key to defining trafficking....
A person may travel of his or her own volition to another location
within his or her own country or abroad and still fall into a state of
involuntary servitude later. The movement of that person to the new
location is not what constitutes trafficking; the force, fraud or coercion
exercised on that person by another to perform or remain in service to the
master is the defining element of trafficking in the modem usage. The
person who is trapped in compelled service after initially voluntarily
migrating or taking ajob willingly is still considered a trafficking victim.
The child sold by his parents to the owner of a brick kiln on the
outskirts of his rural Indian village is a trafficking victim. And, so is the
Mexican man who legally or illegally migrates to the United States, only
269. See supra Part L.A (explaining that the U.N. Protocol does not take into account
victim consent).
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to be threatened and beaten by his agricultural crew leader to keep him
from leaving the job.2 70
The enforcement of trafficking laws in the United States to date has not
reflected this broad understanding of trafficking. This is likely due in part
to the fact that some members of Congress were quite vocal in their desire
to exclude from the Act's protections any victim who consented to some
aspect of his or her transportation or employment.27 1 Their concern seemed
to be that migrants might use the TVPA to obtain immigration benefits after
participating in their own smuggling. These sentiments concretely affected
the drafting of the TVPA. The decision to restrict the full protections of the
Act to "severe victims of trafficking in persons" was a deliberate effort to
deny immigration benefits to individuals who, while exposed to conduct
that constitutes trafficking, gave consent at some point during the process of
their transportation or employment. 272 The result is a law that limits the
availability of protective services, but encourages broad use of the term
"trafficking" in the context of prosecution. Thus, Congress's recognition
that trafficking victims ought not be considered criminals 273 has been
unnecessarily constrained by the unwillingness of many legislators to
recognize that not all trafficking victims are completely "innocent," when
"innocence" is understood to require the complete absence of consent at all
stages of transportation and employment.
Congress's decision to narrow the class eligible for assistance under the
Act has affected prosecution and outreach efforts under the TVPA.
Assistance to individuals who may have played some volitional role in their
transportation or employment, but who are now trapped in virtual slavery, is
disfavored. Furthermore, because the TVPA provides the only available
form of assistance to these individuals in a world where labor law
enforcement turns a virtual blind eye to their exploitation, many of the
trafficking victims in the State Department's annual statistics will never be
aided by either the TVPA or the other laws that the TVPA was designed to
supplement.2 74 The present unwillingness to extend protections to "illegal
270. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 9-10.
271. See 145 Cong. Rec. H2674, H2687 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Conyers); Hedges, supra note 35, at 5A (noting Cornyn's view that an individual must enter
the country against his will to qualify as a trafficking victim); cf 145 Cong. Rec. H2675-87,
H2683 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Smith) (using narrative images of
blameless victims). But cf 145 Cong. Rec. H2684-85 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of
Rep. Pitts) (telling the story of a young girl who "decided to take a chance" on a job offer,
before finding herself enslaved in the sex industry). Under Senator Comyn's definition of
trafficking "victim," the woman in Pitt's story does not seem to qualify for assistance, but a
broad reading of the letter of the law clearly allows her to be treated as such.
272. Thus, Congress was quite explicit about its decision to define the category of
trafficking victims eligible for relief more narrowly than the category of actions that violate
the trafficking laws. H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 90-91 (2000); see also Lee & Lewis, supra
note 4, at 172; Candes, supra note 4, at 593-94, 596-97.
273. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(19) (2000).
274. And just as the Mann Act quickly became less a protective tool than a means of
punishing immigrants and people of color, the TVPA appears to have become useful as a
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workers" absent a showing of their "innocence" embeds into the TVPA the
same immigration and labor law policies that have created a haven for
trafficking and migrant exploitation. Immigration law has long categorized
individuals who have been exploited in the workforce as criminals rather
than victims.275 These distinctions have been fueled by developments in
labor law. Beginning well before Hoffman Plastic, but even more so after
that decision, courts have interpreted the enforcement of IRCA provisions
to require a clear distinction between legal workers, entitled to the full
protection of labor laws, and undocumented workers who are not entitled to
full restitution. Rather than allowing for a reassessment of these policies,
the TVPA mirrors them.
Congressional debate over the TVPA also failed to acknowledge the
complexities of identifying trafficking victims. Legislators tended to paint
trafficking victims as ignorant and innocent victims, targeted by evil
traffickers operating sophisticated international crime rings.276
Unexamined in the debate over trafficking was the fact that the rigid
distinction between trafficking and smuggling grows less and less viable.
The militarization of the border has actually increased the power of
smugglers, and increased the range of their criminal activity in such a way
as to increase, rather than decrease, incidents of trafficking. 277 The line
between smuggling and trafficking has blurred as heightened border
security gives smugglers greater control over migrants and allows them to
command larger fees. Ironically, then, the increased militarization of the
border that has occurred over the past ten years has probably converted
what might once have been a simple act of smuggling into a more abusive
act of trafficking. 278 At the same time, the TVPA defines trafficking in a
way that excludes many of these new victims from the Act's protections.
tool for prosecuting these same groups. Continuing along this path, the TVPA may become
another tool in speeding the deportation of "criminal aliens," rather than an effective means
of providing relief to "aliens." See infra Part III.B.4.
275. See supra Part IIA-B.
276. See Lee & Lewis, supra note 4, at 174; see also infra note 311.
277. See supra Part ll.B.
278. The military-style operations established at certain points along the southwestern
border also have taken a tremendous human toll by pushing migrants into more dangerous
areas of crossing and encouraging them to place themselves in the hands of smugglers. See
Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 193, 221-24 (2003). Reports of death
along the southern border, particularly in the summer months, persist year after year. See,
e.g., Deaths on Border of Arizona Strain Morgue's Capacity, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 2005, at
21; Nick Madigan, Early Heat Wave Kills 12 Illegal Immigrants in the Arizona Desert, N.Y.
Times, May 26, 2005, at A18; National Briefing: Arizona: Death Along the Border, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 2, 2003, at A23 (reporting that the death toll for Mexicans crossing the U.S.-
Mexico border had reached 151 in the year 2003, up from 145 in 2002). The stories involve
horrible deaths, like the smothering death of eighteen Mexican migrants who were traveling
in a trailer in excruciating heat across the southern border of Texas during the summer of
2003. Simon Romero & David Barboza, Trapped in Heat in Texas Truck, 18 People Die,
N.Y. Times, May 15, 2003, at Al. The driver of the truck, a Jamaican immigrant, was
charged and convicted, not of trafficking, but of smuggling, violation of the prohibitions on
transporting and harboring an "alien," and related conspiracy charges. See Ralph
Blumenthal, Immigrant-Smuggling Case Against Driver Goes to Jury, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19,
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This simplistic understanding of the trafficking victim creates concrete
problems: Advocates for clients who are potentially classifiable as victims
of trafficking may be unable to readily determine which of their clients are
eligible for relief under the TVPA and which of them will be subject to
deportation. And because Congress has thus far failed to address the
shortfalls of other labor protections for undocumented migrants, and has
increased the likelihood that undocumented migrants will not have reliable
legal means for remaining in the country, those migrants who do not qualify
as trafficking victims seldom qualify for any other meaningful remedies
against their employers, and are at high risk for removal. Current labor and
immigration policies favor deportation as the remedy for ending the
exploitation of undocumented workers and interdiction as the preventative
strategy. These policies continue to cancel out many of the potential
benefits of the TVPA. Until there is a willingness to provide more
assistance-or at least enforce pertinent labor protections-for those
"smuggled" noncitizens who toil in virtual slavery, most of the tens of
thousands of "trafficking victims" who are included in the annual estimates
will never actually be aided by the Act.
Many instances of trafficking could be effectively addressed through
three simple steps. First, allow all workers to seek remedies under
Commerce Clause-based and Thirteenth Amendment-based laws. Second,
when necessary, provide workers with legal protection allowing them to
remain in the United States while pursuing meritorious claims. Third,
rather than guiding prosecutors to look for narrowly defined instances of
trafficking, encourage them instead to press criminal charges against those
employers who exploit their employees. In the absence of such policies,
even bona fide "severe victims of trafficking in persons"--not to mention
those workers whose exploitation constitutes something less in the eyes of
the law-will continue to live at the mercy of their employers. In the quest
for the innocent victims, we have left countless vulnerable individuals
outside of the scope of the laws' protections.
2. Law and Order: Sacrificing Protection for Prosecution
Yet another reason the TVPA has been such an ineffective tool in aiding
trafficking victims is that it overemphasizes prosecution, while
underemphasizing protection and prevention. 279  This problem is
manifested in at least two different ways. First, when "severe victims of
2005, at A11. The survivors were not granted T-visas because they were not classified as
trafficking victims. See Smuggler Faces Death Penalty in New Trial, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12,
2005, at A19. They were, however, able to obtain legal status though S-visas in exchange
for their assistance in the prosecution of their smugglers. Id The case of the migrants caught
in the Texas truck illustrates the great circular irony of U.S. immigration laws: Border
militarization, rather than decreasing alien smuggling, drives people into the hands of
smugglers and traffickers.
279. Dalrymple, supra note 4; Sadruddin, Walter & Hidalgo, supra note 5; Note, The
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, supra note 4, at 2194.
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trafficking" are identified, the law requires their participation in criminal
prosecutions as a condition of assistance. Second, the primary "prevention"
strategy for trafficking in the United States has been border interdiction,
which is in itself prosecutorial and which actually seems to facilitate rather
than prevent trafficking.
The provisions governing eligibility for T-visas demonstrate the primacy
of prosecution over protection. As previously noted, T-visas are available
to those who "compl[y] with any reasonable request for assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking." 280 The language does
not expressly bar the issuance of T-visas to those whose cooperation is not
sought. The T-visa may be extended to any victims who would suffer
"extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal."'281
As a matter of practice, however, the regulations governing the
implementation of the TVPA indicate that the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") is strongly encouraged to obtain the formal endorsement
of law enforcement prior to issuing a T-visa. 282 Furthermore, the text of the
TVPA itself indicates that outright refusal to assist results in the denial of a
T-visa application under the terms of the Act.
The regulations governing the issuance of T-visas and other victim
assistance also make some difficult demands on trafficking victims. 283 The
regulations governing the T-visa application process require that an
applicant, who must be a victim of "severe forms of trafficking in
persons," 284 first comply with "any reasonable request for assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking [in persons];" and second,
demonstrate that she would suffer from "extreme hardship involving
unusual and severe harm upon removal [from the United States]. ''285 Both
of these prongs must be met to secure three-year legal residency through a
T-visa.286 The individual must also demonstrate either cooperation with
law enforcement or demonstrate that she would suffer "extreme hardship
involving unusual and severe harm" to secure lawful permanent resident
status upon expiration of the T-visa.287
Similarly, obtaining the certification from the Department of Human
Services that entitles the trafficking victim to social service benefits
280. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(T) (2000).
281. Id.
282. 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(b)(3) (2005).
283. See generally Sadruddin, Walter & Hidalgo, supra note 5; Jennifer M. Wetmore, The
New T- Visa: Is the Higher Extreme Hardship Standard Too High for Bona Fide Trafficking
Victims?, 9 New Eng. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 159 (2003).
284. TVPAII § 107(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2000).
285. Id; New Classification for Victims of Severe Trafficking in Persons: Eligibility for
"T" Nonimmigrant Status, 67 Fed. Reg. 4784 (Jan. 31, 2002). The "severe harm" standard is
much higher than the standard that is used in seemingly synonymous cases involving
requests for political asylum on the basis of gender persecution. See Wetmore, supra note
283, at 175.
286. TVPA § 107(e)(1).
287. Id. § 107(f). An additional showing of three years permanent residence and good
moral character must also be made at this stage. Id.
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requires the person to certify that they will "assist in every reasonable way
in the investigation and prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in
persons" 288
Unfortunately, trafficking victims are often poorly equipped to serve as
witnesses. Assisting in prosecution requires a person to be able to think
clearly, to remember and give details, and to tell a consistent story.289 Yet
many of the most abused trafficking victims are ill-equipped to do these
very things. 290 Because of the constant threat under which many victims
find themselves, dissociation is a common response. Under the strain of
their experiences, trafficking victims may lose track of time and may be
unable to account for significant portions of their days. They may also
seem emotionally numb, which means they will show no emotion in
recounting traumatic events. 291 They may develop learned helplessness that
ends the need for captors to exert any external coercion upon them, and they
may even develop a traumatic attachment to their perpetrators. 292 When
one or all of these situations occur, it may be impossible for a person to
comply with a "reasonable request" 293 to assist in prosecution, although the
medical issues at stake may be far from clear to government officials.
Without access to skilled counsel-in itself a situation far from assured-it
is clear that some trafficking victims will simply lose out on any possible
protections lecause of the witness requirements.
The prosecutorial bent of the T-visa is not a new phenomenon. After all,
the T-visa is modeled upon the S-visa, which has been used to provide
immigration benefits to cooperators in criminal prosecutions. Prosecutors
granted S-visas to the Mexican nationals victimized by one trafficking
scheme that took place prior to the Act.294 Thus, rather than marking a sea
change in the way that victims are viewed, the administration of the T-visa
reflects continuity with past immigration policies. 295 In this respect, it is
288. Id. § 107(b)(1)(E)(i)(I). The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2003 § 4(b) eliminated the requirement of cooperation for children under eighteen. Prior to
that time, the statute appeared to require this cooperation from children.
289. Sadruddin, Walter & Hidalgo, supra note 5, at 396.
290. Id. at 398-406.
291. Id. at 404.
292. Id.
293. TVPA § 107(e).
294. See supra Part I.C. S-visas have long been granted to immigrants classified as
material witnesses for criminal prosecutions. They were granted to a group of women and
teenage girls from Mexico who were forced to work as prostitutes in migrant camps in
Florida and to a South Asian domestic worker abused by her employers. See Mireya
Navarro, Group Forced Illegal Aliens into Prostitution, U.S. Says, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24,
1998, at A10; Mireya Navarro, In Land of the Free, A Modern Slave, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1996, at A22; see also Volpp, supra note 149, at 514-15.
295. Many states have begun to enact their own state law anti-trafficking initiatives. But
states are incapable of offering the immigration benefits that the federal government can
provide, so it is perhaps no surprise that these statutes have also focused on criminalization
rather than protection. Stephanie Richard, Note, State Legislation and Human Trafficking:
Helpful or Harmful?, 38 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 447 (2005) (arguing that state legislation
designed to combat human trafficking has focused on mere criminalization, raising serious
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once again apparent that although the Act promises bold new ways of
dealing with trafficking victims, the steps toward providing more assistance
to trafficking victims have, in fact, been quite measured. "When services
and protections are conditioned on the victim's ability to meet difficult
immigration eligibility standards and to cooperate with 'every reasonable
request' by law enforcement, the law is not truly focused on protecting
victims."296
Prosecution efforts also trump efforts to prevent trafficking. To date,
border interdiction strategies have been the primary tool used to prevent
trafficking in the United States. But border enforcement efforts have served
to increase rather than decrease human trafficking. 297 These measures,
which allow smugglers to charge ever-higher fees for their services, both
increase the profits of transporting migrants across borders and make it
more likely that the smuggled individual will be subjected to a peonage-
style arrangement upon their arrival in the destination country. 298 Because
those who pay for the services of smugglers do not fit the profile of the
perfectly innocent victim, they are unlikely to receive the protections of the
TVPA. Moreover, because Congress is now satisfied that the TVPA
protects the only "true victims" of human trafficking, there is even less
incentive to address the dearth of labor protections for all other
undocumented workers in the United States.
Nora Demleitner has noted that immigration law has increasingly become
"an adjunct to criminal law as it is being used to further punish criminal
offenders and to reward those who cooperate in criminal investigations. '" 299
The TVPA provides another example of this trend.
3. Too Much Sex: Conflating Prostitution and Trafficking
Discussions around both domestic and international human trafficking
frequently focus on the rights of women and children. There are many
good reasons for this. Because of their social and political marginalization
and lack of access to economic resources in many parts of the world,
women and children are often the most vulnerable to trafficking.300
Nevertheless, the focus on women and children should not be equated with
an exclusive focus on sex work. Women and children are trafficked for a
number of reasons. Child labor is in demand in agricultural and service
sectors in many economies, and in some places children may also be
concerns about necessary victim protection and effective prosecution in these cases, and
urging more balanced state legislation).
296. Sadruddin, Walter & Hidalgo, supra note 5, at 398.
297. Andreas, supra note 186; Lee, supra note 1, at 12.
298. Lee, supra note 1, at 12.
299. Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement
Tools in the 'War'on Terrorism?, 51 Emory L.J. 1059, 1059 (2002).
300. See Hyland, supra note 4, at 35-36; Lee, supra note 1, at 2; Alison N. Stewart,
Report from the Roundtable on the Meaning of "Trafficking in Persons ": A Human Rights
Perspective, 20 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 11-19 (1998).
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trafficked as soldiers. 301 Women are trafficked primarily into not only the
sex industry or forced marriage, but also into sweatshop labor and domestic
servitude. 302
Historically, definitions of trafficking have been synonymous with sex
trafficking. The 1949 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in
Persons and the Exploitation of Prostitution of Others focused attention
solely on the use of coercion to secure prostitution.30 3 One of the major
breakthroughs of the U.N. Protocol is that it emphasizes the element of
coercion rather than the type of work that the trafficked individual is
coerced into performing. 304
This shift was the result of pressure by a number of NGOs that, over the
years, have urged that treating trafficking and sex work as synonymous is
both over-inclusive and under-inclusive--over-inclusive because it sweeps
in those who have consented to migrate within or among countries to
perform sex work, and under-inclusive because it pays insufficient attention
to those who are forced into other forms of labor. During the drafting of the
U.N. Protocol this issue became a point of serious contention. Because of
the seemingly irreconcilable differences of opinion on this issue, the final
version of the U.N. Protocol takes no position as to whether prostitution
itself constitutes exploitation. 305
The TVPA tracks the U.N. Protocol in its emphasis on the manner in
which labor is obtained rather than on the nature of the work. The
definition of "severe forms of trafficking in persons" contemplates not just
sex work but all coerced labor. But the TVPA's broad definition of
"trafficking" has not been matched in the enforcement of the Act.
Indeed, it was not until 2005, almost five years after the passage of the
Act, that the State Department placed an emphasis on forced labor in its
annual report on trafficking. The 2005 report stated, "Over the next year,
the Department of State intends to focus more attention on involuntary
servitude and its related manifestations. ' 30 6 The report continued,
With the passage of the TVPA and the drafting of the 2000 U.N.
Protocol on trafficking, anti-trafficking efforts shifted from the paradigm
of earlier international conventions, which focused largely on the
international movement of women for prostitution, to one based on the
denial of freedom and resulting victimization. The definition of
301. Lee, supra note 1, at 2.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 6.
304. Potts, supra note 6, at 238. But see Bruch, supra note 6, at 3 (questioning whether
there has actually been a shift, and noting that "current approaches to human trafficking
replicate many of the flaws of earlier approaches-namely, a focus on victimization, a
fruitless cycle of debate on the role of prostitution, problematic definitional questions, and a
process of decision-making that excludes critical voices").
305. Bhabha, supra note 10, at 2.
306. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 8.
3028 [Vol. 74
MISERYAND MYOPIA
trafficking in persons in these instruments covers a wide array of
exploitation that amounts to involuntary servitude.30 7
The report proceeds to elaborate on the history of U.S. prohibitions on
forced labor, and the role that the TVPA plays in updating and improving
the effectiveness of these prohibitions. 30 8 And in 2005, for the first time,
the State Department designated several countries noncompliant with
international anti-trafficking efforts, primarily as a result of the failure of
these countries to address trafficking for forced labor.30 9 That this is the
first time illustrates all too plainly the fact that the international focus for
anti-trafficking efforts has, until this year, been almost exclusively on sex
trafficking.
The lack of attention to the more general question of the forced labor
during the first four years of the life of the Trafficking Act is not surprising.
The rhetoric surrounding the passage and implementation of the TVPA
suggested that political leaders in both the executive and legislative
branches were held captive to a historical conception of human
trafficking-one that focused almost exclusively upon sex trafficking.
Indeed, the bill initially introduced by Representatives Christopher Smith
and Louise Slaughter would have limited the definition of trafficking to sex
work-whether or not it was coerced-and limited relief to women and
children. 310
Although congressional understanding of trafficking expanded prior to
the passage of the TVPA, stories involving sexual exploitation were, by far,
the most common stories invoked during consideration of the Act.3 11 Some
307. Id. at 9.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 8.
310. The Freedom from Sexual Trafficking Act of 1999, H.R. 1356, 106th Cong. (1999);
see Nathan, supra note 36.
311. The anecdotes that were highlighted during the floor debate on the legislation, some
factual and some fanciful composites, included many examples of forced prostitution.
Christopher Smith (R-NJ), one of the co-sponsors of the House bill, told the story of Lydia
from "you can fill in the name of the country here, the Ukraine, Russia, Rumania, Lithuania,
the Czech Republic," a girl who was enticed to dinner with the promise of a modeling job,
was drugged at dinner, and awoke to find herself "here you can fill in another set of
countries, be it Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, some Middle Eastern countries, even as far
as Japan, Canada, and of course, the United States." There, she found herself "owned" by a
man who claims she owes him thousands of dollars for her transportation and care. He used
coercion, as well as physical force-including rape-to force her to work in the sex industry.
When authorities finally uncovered the brothel where she worked, she was deported. 146
Cong. Rec. H2675, H2683 (daily ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Smith).
Representative Joseph Pitts from New Jersey told "the story of a young girl from a very poor
family in a developing country who had hopes for a better life in a wealthier land." When
someone (not identified in Pitts's narrative) offered her a job,
she took the chance. When she got where she was going, she could tell something
was wrong. She was led to a hot, dirty trailer and locked inside with a handful of
other women, women with emotionless faces and broken spirits. It was there that
her life as a sex slave began. At first, she refused to do what she was told, but she
could only take so many beatings. Then 30 men a day entered her trailer and raped
her .... [I]t happened in Florida.
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members of Congress seemed convinced that they were enacting a sex
trafficking bill. 3 12 As with the Mann Act that preceded the TVPA by
almost a century, the debate often created a sense that the TVPA was not
meant to protect people from contemporary slavery, but rather to serve as a
tool to save innocent victims from sexual predators.
To date, the majority of the people who have applied for T-visas report
being forced into labor, such as construction and domestic work. 313 But
official accounts and public perception of trafficking are at odds with this
reality.
As the 2005 State Department Report makes clear, this tendency to think
about trafficking as synonymous with sexual exploitation has also
influenced U.S. foreign policy. This is particularly unfortunate because the
aspect of the TVPA that holds the most potential for fighting trafficking lies
in its recognition that the trafficking problem is an international issue that
requires international solutions. This recognition constitutes a clear break
from past policy in the areas of smuggling and labor law, and to a lesser
Id. at H2684-85. The woman spent two years in detention awaiting deportation to Mexico.
Id. Representative Jan Schakowsy (D-IL) told the story of "a young girl named Nurjahan in
Bangladesh" who "at 8,... was bought by a brothel in Pakistan probably for between $200
and $1,500. She finally escaped from a life as a sex slave," but bore acid scars, not to
mention "invisible" psychological scars. Id. at H2686.
312. Representative Louise M. Slaughter (D-NY) was careful to emphasize the fact that
the bill did not solely concern sexual slavery. She stated,
The bill recognizes the fact that trafficking is not exclusively a crime of sexual
exploitation. Taken independently, this action is an egregious practice in and of
itself. It is also important, however, to be aware that people are being illegally
smuggled across borders to work in sweatshops, domestic servitude or other
slavery-like conditions.
146 Cong. Rec. H9029, H9030 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000) (statement of Rep. Slaughter).
Representative Gejdenson was equally cautious. See 146 Cong. Rec. H2675, H2684 (daily
ed. May 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Gejdenson). But many other representatives who spoke
in support of the bill continued to refer to the bill imprecisely. Representative Donald Payne
from New Jersey declared, "Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 3244, a bill on sex
trafficking on the floor at this time." 146 Cong. Rec. H9036, H9043 (statement of Rep.
Payne). Representative Carolyn Maloney of New York similarly declared,
The International Sexual Trafficking Bill is important because not only does it take
steps to eliminate the sex trafficking industry by punishing the predators that
exploit women around the world, but it also takes steps to protect the victims of
sex trafficking. The bill sets forth the minimum international standards for the
elimination of sex trafficking. It establishes criminal and civil penalties. And it
does many other things.
Id. at H9044 (statement of Rep. Maloney); see also id. at H9045 (statement of Rep.
Radanovich) (referring to "the Sex Trafficking Conference Report"); id. at H9046 (statement
of Rep. Udall) (describing the TVPA as an effort "to curb exploitation of women who are the
victims of the international sex trade").
313. Nathan, supra note 36. Journalist Debbie Nathan also suggests that the Department
of Justice may be erroneously classifying as instances of "sex trafficking" cases that involve
instances of rape or sexual assault by the employers of women who are working as "cooks,
waitresses and housekeepers," but notes that the charge is difficult to substantiate because
the Department does not release a detailed narrative of each case. Id
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extent, sex trafficking. 314 Unfortunately, the international strategy has been
substantially hindered by the conflation of prostitution and trafficking. This
myopic view of trafficking lingers from the time of the adoption of the
Mann Act.
The TVPA created an infrastructure for development programs aimed at
some of the economic root causes of trafficking in source countries. The
TVPA mandates the establishment of programs designed to deter trafficking
through the creation of positive financial alternatives to potential trafficking
victims.315 These programs include job development, counseling, and
training, as well as programs designed to keep children in school. 316
Additionally, funds are used to train international government officials and
NGOs to recognize and fight trafficking. And there are funds specially
designated to provide information on the illegality of sex tourism to
travelers. 317 But the Act does not simply expand the availability of foreign
aid; the Act also uses foreign aid to create pressure on foreign governments
to address the international aspects of the trafficking problem. 318 All
countries that receive foreign assistance from the U.S. prepare reports
regarding their own anti-trafficking initiatives, the treatment of trafficking
victims under their laws and practices, and the countries' own cooperation
with international anti-trafficking efforts.3 19
Each year, the State Department categorizes every country into one of
three tiers: Tier 1 countries are considered to be fully compliant with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking under the TVPA; Tier
2 countries are countries making "significant efforts" to meet the minimum
314. As previously noted, the Mann Act was bound up with a broader international
agenda concerning the "white slave trade," see supra Part II.C, but unlike the TVPA, it was
not linked with any program of international aid or cooperation.
315. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004).
316. Id. § 7104(a)(3); see also Hyland, supra note 4, at 62; Note, The Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, supra note 4, at 2189.
317. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7104(e)(1). Efforts against sex tourism and child prostitution have
received an even greater boost from the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act"), Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117
Stat. 650 (2003) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), which was passed by the
Congress in April 2003 and signed into law by President George W. Bush. The PROTECT
Act allows law enforcement officers to prosecute American citizens and legal permanent
residents who travel abroad and commercially sexually abuse minors without having to
prove prior intent to commit this crime. The law also increases the sentences for child sex
tourists from a maximum of fifteen years to a maximum of thirty years imprisonment. The
PROTECT Act also expands the potential reach of federal sex trafficking prosecutions by
extending federal jurisdiction to crimes committed in foreign commerce; establishes parallel
penalty enhancements for the production of child pornography overseas; and criminalizes
actions to arrange or facilitate the travel of child sex tourists. 2005 State Department Report,
supra note 3, at 240. The most recent State Department Report on trafficking details many
of the initiatives that have been funded as a result of the TVPA. Id.
318. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 240. These included assistance to
foreign countries in drafting laws to combat trafficking, strengthen investigation and
prosecution on traffickers, and create programs to assist victims. It also included an
expansion of U.S. government exchange and international visitor programs focusing on
trafficking. Id.
319. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151(f) (West Supp. 2004).
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standards; and Tier 3 countries are those whose governments are neither in
compliance with the minimum standards nor are found to be making
significant efforts to become compliant.320  If a country has made
insufficient efforts to combat trafficking-that is, if a country is designated
Tier 3-that country is subject to sanctions. 32 1
Countries receiving aid must also take an anti-trafficking pledge, as do
the recipients of federal contracts, grants, and agreements with private
entities receiving funds from the United States. Under the terms of the
pledge, aid agreements and contracts are terminated if the other party
engages in conduct that violates the TVPA.322
While efforts to ensure compliance surely deserve praise, the pledge
exceeds its mandate: The anti-trafficking pledge now includes a promise
pledge to preach abstinence and a refusal to provide aid to organizations
that do not espouse the abolition of prostitution,323 although very little
research substantiates this link between prostitution and trafficking.324
With echoes of the Mann Act, the anti-trafficking pledge demonstrates the
conflation of morality-based legislation with anti-trafficking efforts. 325
4. The Others: Anti-immigrant Sentiment and Racial Stereotyping
Corporations and the subcontractors retained by corporations sometimes
engage in acts that might be classified as violations of the TVPA's
prohibitions on involuntary servitude, forced labor, and peonage. But while
such corporations are occasionally prosecuted for violations of alien
smuggling laws and other labor violations, they escape charges of
"trafficking" either because the workers who suffer exploitation are deemed
320. New Publications, Interpreter Releases (West), June 20, 2005, at 1044. The 2005
report also includes "Tier 2 watch countries." These are countries that fell to a lower tier
from the 2004 report or evince other notable characteristics, such as a number of trafficking
victims that are either very significant or significantly increasing. Id.
321. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a) (legislating that countries that are not compliant with the
United States' minimum anti-trafficking standards are ineligible for "nonhumanitarian,
nontrade-related foreign assistance"). The President has the authority to waive such
sanctions in limited circumstances. Id. § 7107(d)(5)(B). Indeed, Ambassador John Miller,
the Senior Advisor on Trafficking in Persons at the Department of State, emphasized in his
statements accompanying the release of the 2005 report that it was the State Department's
intent to "motivate" Tier 3 countries to act, rather than to sanction them. New Publications,
supra note 320, at 1045.
322. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7104(g).
323. Larry Rohter, Prostitution Puts U.S. and Brazil at Odds on AIDS Policy, N.Y.
Times, July 24, 2005, at A3 (reporting that, in order to receive money for programs to fight
AIDS, organizations in developing countries must pledge not only to support anti-trafficking
initiatives but also must oppose prostitution); Matt Steinglass, The Question of Rescue, N.Y.
Times, July 24, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 18 (explaining the link between anti-trafficking and
anti-prostitution efforts, and noting that organizations carrying out these dual roles receive
substantial U.S. aid money, while those that work with prostitutes do not). The pledge
demonstrates how, once again, anti-trafficking initiatives have been bound up with-and in
some senses overshadowed by-an agenda of sexual morality. See infra Part III.B.3.
324. Nathan, supra note 36.
325. See infra Part III.B.3.
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to have consented to the terms of their employment, or because the actions
of these corporations are not viewed as sufficiently egregious to constitute
trafficking.
At least two prominent corporations have recently been involved in cases
alleging workplace exploitation that might be viewed as trafficking. First, a
2001 indictment of Tyson Foods included allegations that the company paid
coyotes to recruit ongoing streams of undocumented workers for its plants
in Arkansas, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. 326 These immigrants allegedly were subject to higher production
demands and less humane working conditions than legal workers. 327 The
case was closely observed by immigration lawyers and labor leaders
because they viewed methods used by Tyson Foods in recruiting and
employing its undocumented workers as exemplifying the practices in many
large food processing companies. 328 Although the charges against Tyson
Foods were premised on the notion that the company exploited its workers'
vulnerable legal status to coerce them into working in substandard
conditions, no trafficking violations were alleged.
Second, following a four-year investigation, federal immigration officials
detained more than 250 undocumented immigrants working at sixty Wal-
Mart stores around the country in October of 2003.329 The employees in
question alleged that they had been subjected to severely substandard
employment conditions. One worker explained that he worked fifty-six
hours a week making $6.25 an hour, 363 nights a year.330 Wal-Mart's labor
practices allegedly included physically locking workers inside stores
overnight-a practice also commonly used with immigrant workers in New
York area supermarkets. 331 Nevertheless, no charges of trafficking were
raised against either Wal-Mart or its subcontractors. Instead, Wal-Mart was
charged with violations of smuggling laws, and those charges were dropped
after Wal-Mart agreed to pay the government $11 million.332
The alleged actions of these corporations apparently would have justified
trafficking charges. The companies, or at the very least their
subcontractors, did not simply hire undocumented workers in violation of
326. Indictment at 9, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 26896
(E.D. Tenn. May 22, 2002) (No. 4:01-CR-61), available at http://
www.tned.uscourts.gov/cases/40 1 cr06 1/tyson.PDF.
327. Id.
328. Sherri Day, Jury Clears Tyson Foods in Use of Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 27, 2003, at A14.
329. Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Raids by U.S. Aimed at Illegal Aliens, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 24, 2003, at Al.
330. Steven Greenhouse, Cleaner at Wal-Mart Tells of Few Breaks and Low Pay, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 2003, at A10.
331. Steven Greenhouse, Workers Say Late Shifts Often Mean Locked Exits, N.Y. Times,
June 18, 2004, at BI.
332. Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart to Pay U.S. $11 Million in Lawsuit on Immigrant
Workers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2005, at Al; see also Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F.
Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005) (dismissing RICO claims predicated on trafficking claims
against Wal-Mart).
2006] 3033
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
immigration laws. These companies also used the threat of legal sanction to
force those undocumented workers to labor harder, longer, and under more
demeaning conditions than legal workers. Such acts should be publicly
labeled "trafficking," but they are not. Mainstream corporate employers are
seldom even charged with general immigration violations, 333 and of the few
companies that have been so charged, none have been charged with
violating the TVPA. These companies also continue to shield themselves
from liability for other labor and immigration law violations by arguing that
they were unaware of the violations committed by their subcontractors. 334
At the same time that Wal-Mart and Tyson Foods faced and settled or
defeated smuggling charges, the government was also prosecuting the case
of United States v. Kil Soo Lee under the provisions of the TVPA.335 That
case involved two hundred Vietnamese and Chinese nationals, mostly
young women, who had been forced to work in a Daewoosa garment
factory in American Samoa. The workers were held in a guarded
compound and were threatened with confiscation of their passports, false
arrest, and other economic and legal punishments. On February 21, 2003, a
jury convicted Lee, the owner of the factory, on nearly all counts. 336
Kil Soo Lee is the most significant trafficking case to date, both in terms
of the number of victims assisted, and the degree of publicity the case has
received as a successful TVPA prosecution. It involved foreign defendants
operating a factory outside of the U.S. 3 3 7 The cases involving Wal-Mart
and Tyson Foods also included allegations of the exploitation of immigrant
labor, particularly through the use of threats of legal punishment. But those
companies were never even charged with, let alone convicted of,
333. Cornelius, supra note 184, at 785. Indeed, since the passage of the TVPA, the
number of investigations launched by the INS and its progeny has actually plummeted. In
1998, there were 7788 such investigations. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2003 Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics 157 tbl.39 (2004), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2003/Table39.xls. In 2000, that number
fell to 1966. Id. In 2001, it was 1595. Id. Although it has risen slightly since then, by 2003
(the last year for which data is available), the number was 2194. Id. Preventing trafficking
requires more, not less, government monitoring of employers. Yet the overall number of
inspections is less than half of what it was seven years ago. Id.
334. Wal-Mart representatives claimed that Wal-Mart's "executives knew nothing about
the employment of illegal immigrants before the raids and that the janitors were hired by
contractors that Wal-Mart used to clean its stores late at night. Company officials said they
used more than 100 contractors to clean more than 700 of its stores." Greenhouse, supra note
332, at Al. None of the contractors were charged with trafficking. Id ("In a statement...
federal officials announced that 12 janitorial contractors that worked for Wal-Mart had
agreed to forfeit $4 million to the government and to plead guilty to criminal charges of
employing illegal immigrants.").
335. United States v. Kil Soo Lee, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Haw. 2001); see also 2003
State Department Report, supra note 17, § III.D. 1.
336. 2003 State Department Report, supra note 17, § III.D. I.
337. Another large investigation-this one a domestic case involving fifty-nine Peruvians
who appear to have been working in slave-like conditions for as long as four years on Long
Island, also involved immigrant defendants-Mariluz Zavala, her husband Jose Ibanez, and
their daughter, Evelyn Ibanez. See Bart Jones, Human Trafficking, 'Modern-Day Slavery,'
Newsday, Sept. 21, 2004, at A8.
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trafficking. Why were the actions of the Kil Soo Lee corporate defendants
readily identified as trafficking, while the actions of the Tyson Foods and
Wal-Mart corporate defendants were not?
There are two related explanations. First, the harsh sentences and
political rhetoric surrounding the TVPA may actually operate to limit
prosecutions under the Act, even in cases where the conduct in question
seems to violate the letter of the TVPA. Since the enactment of the TVPA,
a trafficking charge carries a particular stigma, one that seems best reserved
for the worst of the worst offenders. The lengthy prison sentences required
for "trafficking" are harsher than those designed for smugglers and much
harsher than those designed for violations of wage and hour or other labor
laws. Because most people in the United States are not conditioned to view
the general exploitation of migrant labor as an evil on par with sex
trafficking, prosecutors may be reluctant to attach the harsh penalties and
high stigma of the TVPA to all but the most unpopular and politically
powerless offenders. 338
Ironically, it is thus possible that the very success of the TVPA in
generating the social notion that trafficking is, as President Bush has said, a
"special evil," may actually explain why mainstream companies and high-
profile actors are never charged with trafficking. As trafficking has been
linked in the public imagination with child prostitution and sex tourism, it
has been decoupled from workplace abuses that may indeed amount to
peonage and involuntary servitude. Congress's failure to discuss the
possible expansion of the Thirteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause-
based remedies to undocumented migrants cemented the idea that, rather
than operating on a continuum, the abuse of laborers fell into two clear
camps: virtual or actual enslavement, particularly sexual slavery, and
"common" workplace violations unworthy of substantial new criminal
punishment or victim remedies.
Second, noncitizens are easier targets for harsh sanctions such as those
required by the TVPA than are U.S. citizens or U.S corporations. U.S. law
has already dehumanized noncitizens. 339 They have been criminalized in
338. Cf Tracey L. Meares, Neal Katyal & Dan M. Kahan, Updating the Study of
Punishment, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1171, 1185-86 (2004) (concluding that when "increasing the
penalty on a particular law is out of step with norms in a community, it may reduce
deterrence instead of promoting it" because fewer prosecutions will be sought under the
law).
339. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social
and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 263, 267 (1997)
(stating that the dehumanizing term "alien" forms the core around which the Immigration
and Nationality Act is framed); see also Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government
Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L.
Rev. 1425, 1428 (1995); Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory
Treatment by the National Government, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 303 ("The very word,
'alien,' calls to mind someone strange and out of place, and it has often been used in a
distinctly pejorative way.").
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popular rhetoric. 340 The tendency to conflate noncitizens and criminals has
become even more common on in the wake of September 11, 2001, as
immigrants are increasingly depicted as a security threats. In the face of
popular assumptions that "aliens" are "criminals," accusing such
individuals of the "special evil" of trafficking does not seem like such a
leap. President Bush's linkage of the trafficking problem with antiterrorism
efforts also feeds the stereotype of the trafficker as a foreigner.
In light of the negative images of immigrants, it is perhaps unsurprising
that a survey of trafficking cases publicized by the Department of Justice,
suggests that the most common defendant in trafficking cases is a
noncitizen, of Latin American, African, or Asian origin.341 As with Mann
Act enforcement, there seems to be a very noticeable prosecutorial bias
about who a "trafficker" is. Thus, in the very rare instances that
mainstream companies are found to abuse migrant labor, they are charged
with smuggling, not trafficking. This is not to argue against pursuing
trafficking charges against noncitizen defendants when those defendants are
engaged in acts of trafficking. Because the trafficking problem is
international in nature, defendants of many ethnic and national backgrounds
may be prosecuted. But effective enforcement of anti-trafficking laws
requires that these laws be enforced not just against politically unpopular
noncitizens and immigrants, but also against U.S. citizen employers and
340. See, e.g., David Brooks, Two Steps Toward a Sensible Immigration Policy, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 14, 2005, at D12 ("[R]ight now immigration chaos is spreading a subculture of
criminality across America.").
341. See, e.g., April Bulletin, supra note 68, at 6, 8-9 (summarizing United States v.
Mubang, resulting in a jury verdict against a naturalized citizen and former Cameroonian in
a case involving the trafficking of an eleven-year-old Cameroonian citizen into domestic
slavery; United States v. Lopez-Torres, involving a defendant of Mexican descent who pled
guilty to Mann Act and weapons violations in connection with a smuggling ring bringing
Mexican women to Austin, Texas, for sex work; United States v. Udeozor, involving a jury
conviction of a Nigerian woman and her husband for holding a young Nigerian girl in
conditions of involuntary servitude); Anti-Trafficking News Bull. (U.S. Dep't of Justice Civ.
Rights Div., Wash., D.C.), Jan. 2004, at 8-9 (summarizing United States v. Martinez-Uresti,
resulting in October 10, 2003, guilty pleas from two women of Mexican descent-at least
one of whom, DeHoyos, was a Mexican citizen-in a case involving the operation of a ring
to bring young Mexican girls into the U.S.; United States v. Soto, resulting in a January 2004
conviction of men of Mexican origin participating in a U.S.-Mexico smuggling ring in which
the accused held four female aliens in conditions of sexual servitude in trailers; United States
v. Jimenez-Calderon, an indictment accusing a Mexican family of smuggling Mexican girls
into the U.S. for purposes of prostitution). But see United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145
(1st Cir. 2004) (upholding the conviction of a New Hampshire couple charged with
exploiting two Jamaican immigrant laborers); April Bulletin, supra note 68, at 8
(summarizing United States v. Sutherland, involving a citizen convicted of Mann Act and
sex trafficking violations in connection with a Midwestern child prostitution ring). A survey
of the titles and descriptions of cases summarized in the Civil Rights Division's 2004
Bulletins reveal at least twenty additional cases brought against nonwhite defendants; several
of these cases involved multiple defendants. Only three additional cases appear to involve
white citizen defendants. Of these, only one of these cases includes more than two
defendants. All involved either domestic slavery or child sex rings. None involved the
exploitation of workers in manufacturing, agriculture, or the service industry. None of these
cases involve corporate defendants.
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domestic corporations. Otherwise, the TVPA, like the Mann Act that
preceded it,342 runs the danger of becoming a tool used more often to
incarcerate people of color and speed the deportation of noncitizens, 343 than
to free members of vulnerable immigrant groups from the grips of
criminally self-interested economic actors.
Furthermore, where employer conduct falls short of "severe forms of
trafficking," thoughtful TVPA prosecutions of mainstream employers
engaged in "trafficking" might generate important deterrent effects on the
behavior of those who employ and exploit large numbers of undocumented
migrants, including corporations. In the absence of stronger labor
protections of the undocumented, this would seem to be the best and only
way to reach the tens of thousands of trafficking victims in the country who
are abused by mainstream employers in U.S. workplaces. There is little
evidence that the TVPA is being leveraged to its full potential to stop
workplace exploitation.
C. Borderline: Allowing Interdiction to Eclipse Internal Enforcement
Efforts
Prior to the passage of the Trafficking Act, much of the government's
efforts to prevent irregular migrants from entering the county, and the
domestic workforce, focused upon border interdiction efforts. 344 A great
deal of money and manpower has been poured into militarizing the southern
border.34 5 These interdiction measures generally have been marked by
increased staffing of the Border Patrol, the addition of physical barriers to
entry, and military-style campaigns. 346 They have been widely ineffective
in stemming immigration, and have had harsh collateral consequences for
migrants.34 7
The border interdiction efforts undertaken pursuant to the Trafficking Act
offer at least some minor improvements over past policies. Border
interdiction funds are dedicated to, among other things, providing grants to
nongovernmental organizations to set up "transit shelters" for trafficking
victims at high-trafficking border crossings. 34 8  Although these transit
shelters are staffed by nongovernmental organizations, the organizations in
342. See supra Part II.C.
343. Noncitizens who are found or plead guilty to such offenses are subject to deportation
and permanent exclusion from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H) (2000); see, e.g.,
Anti-Trafficking News Bull. (U.S. Dep't of Justice Civ. Rights Div., Wash., D.C.), Aug.
Sept. 2004, at 4 (describing an anti-trafficking effort named "Operation Little Dragon" and
writing that the "defendants were sentenced to jail terms between 24 and 33 months and
have since been deported from the United States").
344. See supra Part II.A.
345. See, e.g., Cornelius, supra note 184, at 785-88; Hing, supra note 185, at 127-28;
Johnson, supra note 278, at 221-24.
346. See supra Part I.C.
347. See generally Hing, supra note 185; Johnson, supra note 278, at 221-24.
348. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7104(c) (West Supp. 2004).
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turn provide training to government employees to enable them to better
recognize and assist trafficking survivors.349
These improvements are commendable, but they are clearly insufficient
to combat trafficking because they are not supplemented with adequate
efforts to prevent trafficking within the borders of the United States. First
of all, the Act originally did not create any significant programs focused on
training domestic law enforcement officers to recognize the trafficking
problems within the country, although belated efforts to accomplish this
goal have since begun on a small scale.
Second, enforcement of the TVPA had needlessly focused on cross
border trafficking rather than on internal trafficking problems. The text of
the TVPA does not require this. Because both transportation and
employment of trafficking victims are punishable under the TVPA, the
TVPA allows prosecutors to focus not only on transborder movement, but
also on purely internal trafficking and slave labor practices. 350 This is
important, because trafficking operations frequently involve not only
smugglers, but also employers at the end of the chain.351
Unfortunately, rather than break with the interdiction-focused approach
of the past, anti-trafficking efforts have instead fallen into the same pattern.
Prosecutions have focused primarily on the actors involved in transborder
movement of labor while ignoring the domestic businesses that are
sustained by the labor importation activities. 352 Instead of using the popular
support for the Act as a means of tackling domestic workplace abuses, those
charged with the Act's enforcement have instead continued to focus
myopically on the border as the primary locus for anti-trafficking efforts.
This approach not only fails to take advantage of the flexibility of the
Act, but it is also at odds with the TVPA provisions aimed at addressing the
international economic forces undergirding the trafficking problem. The
Act's provisions include programs designed to address the general lack of
economic opportunity for many trafficking victims. 353 In providing for
such programs, Congress demonstrated an awareness of the global market
forces that are a root cause of trafficking. Naturally, the limited collection
of programs designed to offset low wages and scarce job opportunities
abroad cannot even begin to prevent all migrants from continuing to seek
349. Id.
350. 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 6.
351. See Kyle & Dale, supra note 36, at 33 ("Slave importing operations involve efforts
to import vulnerable labor for ongoing enterprises by relatively stable criminal organizations
or even semi-legitimate businesses in the destination country.").
352. The Tyson Foods case is a good example. Because the immigrant workers were
recruited and came of their own free will, there was no focus on the coercive terms of their
employment in the United States. See supra Part lII.B.4; see also supra note 341 (describing
trafficking cases prosecuted to date).
353. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing international sanctions, efforts to train
international NGOs); see also 22 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2000) (directing the President to




opportunities in more economically prosperous countries. But such efforts
are even less likely to succeed if U.S. employers know that they can employ
and exploit immigrant laborers with impunity. Unfortunately, this precisely
sums up the current situation.
When primary receiving countries like the United States engage in
policies that drive migrant workers underground, these countries leave
workers ripe for abuse by their transporters and employers. Yet current
anti-trafficking efforts all but ignore the role of the internal policies of
receiving countries like the United States. Saskia Sassen diagnoses global
efforts to address migration this way:
The policy framework for immigration treats the flow of labor as the
result of individual actions. The receiving country is represented as a
passive agent; the causes for immigration appear to lie outside the control
or domain of the receiving countries; immigration policy becomes a
decision to be more or less benevolent in admitting immigrants.
Absent from this understanding is the notion that the international
activities of governments or firms of receiving countries may have
contributed to the formation of economic linkages with emigration
countries, linkages that may function as bridges not only for capital and
politics but also for migration flow.3
54
The policy framework Sassen summarizes can be seen in the TVPA.
Predictably, the Act pays insufficient attention to the role that U.S. actors,
and actors in other economically powerful nations, play in promoting
trafficking. Countries that are the primary recipients of trafficking victims
are routinely designated by the State Department as fully compliant with
anti-trafficking efforts, regardless of the stream of trafficking victims that
enter their borders.355 Much more attention needs to be paid to what is
happening in workplaces within these borders.
CONCLUSION
The low numbers of traffickers prosecuted and victims protected under
the Trafficking Act cannot simply be attributed to a failure of administrative
will or a lack of resources. A great deal of time, money, and effort has been
put into addressing the problem of trafficking over the past five years. Yet
the number of cases prosecuted and the number of victims assisted remain
low.
To remedy this problem, many incremental changes to the TVPA have
been suggested. Some commentators have called for enhancing victim
protection by making use of the Act's expansive definition of trafficking to
encompass those who played some role in their own initial entry to the U.S.
Other suggestions call for loosening the requirements that victims must
354. Saskia Sassen, Guests and Aliens 151 (1999).
355. See, e.g., 2005 State Department Report, supra note 3, at 42 (classifying all Western
primary receiving countries as Tier 1 countries, fully compliant with anti-trafficking efforts).
30392006]
FORDHAM LA W RE VIEW
meet in order to garner protection, let alone benefits, expanding
investigative efforts, and educating more federal and state local officials to
recognize trafficking when they see it.
All of these suggestions are good, and all would certainly assist more
exploited people than are helped by the law now. But the shortcomings of
the Act stem from the much larger failures of U.S. immigration policy and
related laws regulating labor and prostitution. The failure to protect
workers who are the victims of abusive labor practices has been a feature of
the U.S. legal landscape throughout history, and it has worsened in recent
years. Rather than move to make work safer and more visible for everyone,
U.S. immigration and labor policies have moved populations into the
shadows through rigid border enforcement, lax labor law enforcement, and
corporate practices that continue to allow companies that profit from
trafficking to escape liability. Rather than protecting victims of sexual
servitude, U.S. immigration and anti-trafficking efforts have equated
immigrants with immorality and have worked to stop both at the borders.
The TVPA did nothing to change these long-standing policy choices.
Moreover, enforcement of the Act has been even more narrowly focused
than the language of the law requires. Officials have focused their efforts
upon prostitution. Perhaps this is because addressing this problem garners
more ready support than migrant labor protections in a country that is
currently more concerned with morality and border control than enhancing
the workplace protection of immigrants. Many of the old tropes of the
Mann Act are playing out again in the national conversations about
trafficking. Just as it was at the turn of the last century, this conversation is
once again focused on efforts to keep "immoral" persons outside of the
country, efforts to punish "foreign" men who take advantage of "innocent
victims," and efforts to criminalize and deport any immigrant worker that
does not fit the narrow profile of such a victim.
The failures of the TVPA to reach the estimated tens of thousands of
trafficking victims in this country is far from surprising. In recent decades,
the United States has increasingly limited the legal protections available to
all workers-particularly the undocumented-and has hastened the
deportation of "criminal aliens." To end the misery of human trafficking in
the United States, what is needed is a law that protects and provides
remedies for all workers-including those who may have deliberately
broken the law to get here, or to stay here-but who nevertheless need all of
the protections to which they ought to be entitled as workers and human
beings. Citizen and noncitizen violators of the law must be subject to like
punishment. Simply put, the law must take seriously all of the miseries of
exploitation, and genuinely seek to remedy those ills.
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